The title of this book does not indicate the breadth of information it contains.
The authors certainly have as their objective the exploration of methods of disposing of radioactive waste but the book contains very comprehensive chapters about the origin and nature of the wastes and methods of processing them prior to disposal.
In fact, half of the book has been very usefully allocated to these non–disposal
topics.
This book is the fifteenth in a series of Studies in Environmental Science and the author, who is from the Nuclear Research Institute at Řež, acknowledges contributions from František Cejnar, Václav Kouřim, Eduard Málasěk and Otakar Vojtěch. He stresses the need for safety in the nuclear power industry, which he sees as a new technology even though some of its generating plant is now 25 years old.
Dlouhy states that nuclear power production is unique in most countries in the extent of both the support and the control exercised by the government, with continuous observation and systematic monitoring of its impact on society which ensures that population and environment are safeguarded. Despite the fact that all scientific surveys carried out in this field have confirmed that the nuclear industry does not expose the population to unacceptable risks various groups of the population in many countries still express concern. Waste disposal is a part of the industry which must be given proper attention and adequate resources.
The characteristics of radioactive wastes are discussed, covering the arisings from mining, process plants, nuclear power plants, reprocessing plants and research centres. The processing of liquid and solid wastes is reviewed for the same range of arisings. Additionally, the transport requirements and economic features are dealt with.
The main topic of the book —
that is, radioactive waste disposal —
is given a thorough review from the initial site evaluation through to the final disposal.
In this section there is some ambiguity in the use of the terms storage
and disposal
and the reader must be careful to distinguish which operation is meant.
Generally, storage
is used for the interim stage when it is the intention that the waste will reside in a location for a finite time, whereas disposal
implies an absence of intent ever to retrieve the waste.
The book is a good overview of the whole topic, and contains a wealth of useful information.
The technology involved in the research, development and practice of radioactive waste disposal covers a wide range of disciplines and there is a large and expanding literature of uneven quality.
Keeping up to date, even in one’s own field, is difficult so that authoritative reviews, such as promised by Rustum Roy in his preface to the first volume of this series, are to be welcomed.
Professor Roy himself, with his colleagues at Pennsylvania State University, has established an international reputation in the field of ceramic and synthetic mineral waste forms, so that a monograph on these topic by him would clearly constitute such an authoritative review.
This volume, despite its broader title, is essentially that.
For completeness, other possible matrices, including glass, are considered as are potential corrosion–resisting canister materials and protective overpack/back–filling media.
Again, the importance of considering the package to be but one part of the overall disposal system is emphasized.
However, although this broad approach is necessary and the treatment is good only the sections dealing with ceramic and synthetic mineral waste forms are fully comprehensive and meet the criteria of authoritative reviews
.
Hopefully, the other topics will be dealt with more fully in later monographs.
The concept of converting the waste into such mineral forms as are known from geochemical data to resist deterioration is described at length, both in the text and again in a separate appendix. Manufacturing techniques using modern ceramic technology are discussed and the properties of the final waste forms, including the effect of radiation, outlined. These synthetic minerals can be used either as matrices in which to incorporate the wastes and/or as protective encapsulating barriers. There are inevitably some controversial statements : for example, Roy criticises some of the publicity given to Ringwood’s SYNROC. Some parts are written by colleagues which leads to some unevenness in the presentation. Nevertheless, the volume provides and excellent review on these topics.
Glass, which is the only encapsulating medium actually used with high level wastes, is dealt with in much less detail. The main reference is a general and slightly dated review written in 1978 by Mendel of the Battelle Pacific North West Laboratory and reproduced, in an abbreviated form, as an appendix. Mendel’s original report contained a summary which stated that glass is the obvious choice for encapsulating high level wastes. The summary has not been reproduced. Metallic and cement encapsulating media are dealt with briefly — not that there is much to say about metals.
This attractively written and well presented book describes the mathematical models of the UK energy sector developed at Birmingham University and illustrates the ways in which they can be used. The work is intended as an introduction to the subject and avoids excessive detail. Through the use of clear illustrations, careful subdivision and well written summaries, the reader is led through what might otherwise have been a complex text.
The Birmingham Energy Models (BEM) were developed to provide a means of evaluating and comparing alternative energy strategies spanning a 50 year period.
The main part of the text deals with the use of a linear programming optimisation model, which takes projected energy demands as given and seeks to identify the least cost route to meet them subject to specific constraints on the supply of fuels.
Much of the work was undertaken in the late 1970s and is therefore based on Energy Projections 1979
(published by the Department of Energy) and Gerald Leach’s (IIED) low energy scenarios which appeared in the same year.
For this reason, the actual numbers are dated, despite an updating section to 1980 included in Chapter 10, and the section describing forecasting practices and models used by different organisations in the United Kingdom has been overtaken by events.
Nevertheless the summary of model types is useful.
Were the authors writing their book at this time, they would be drawing attention to the new Department of Energy projections and the new methodologies being applied by the Department and the CEGB1, with heavy reliance on a wide range of scenarios derived from a spread of economic and technical assumptions.
The authors use the model to derive the optimal investment patterns in energy supply, given a projected pattern of demand by sector, and explore the sensitivity to a range of constraints and alternative assumptions. Their least cost solutions for the base case (D.En. 1979 Projection) differed little from the fuel mix favoured by the Department. This is not surprising given the defined sectoral demand pattern.
They explore balance of payments constraints, conservation effects, influence of reserve levels and expanded supply strategies for the different fuels. The results provide yet another way of illustrating the economic benefits arising from the adoption of nuclear power and the penalties for constraining its introduction.
The authors have made no attempt to examine the assumptions underlying the forecasts they use. They accept both Departmental and the IIED scenarios uncritically, and analyse the cost implications of adopted strategies without examining their practicability. This is not due to a lack of appreciation of the problems, since these are set out in the book ; it is however, a reflection of the fact that the optimisation technique used does not of itself allow meaningful criticism of the different scenarios.
An initial approach to more interactive supply–demand scenarios is set out in the penultimate chapter of the book, which seeks to extend the model to embody internally derived fuel demand based on assumed economic growth rates, relationships of demand to national income and prices, and price induced interfuel substitution. The model is still dependent on assumptions about world fuel prices.
Anyone with an interest in modelling and its application to policy analysis or an interest in energy policy will find this book interesting and stimulating, not least because it reveals an understanding of the issues and adopts a refreshingly non–partisan approach.
This book was reviewed by Mr A.M. Allen in ATOM in September 1980,
when it first appeared in French under the title Le Complex Atomique.
Dr Goldschmidt, former director of International Relations of the French Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique and
one–time chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors, has now set his hand to a revision and expansion of his work for the
English–reading market —
reviewing nearly half a century of political moves and counter–moves, international intrigue and manipulation
in the nuclear world, in the words of the earlier review as an actor in the story rather than a mere spectator
.
The translation, by Bruce Adkins, is first class.
This publication aims to draw attention to the recent literature on nuclear energy and its technology available at the Science Reference Library in London. The library holds more than 500 monographs on nuclear topics published since 1970, a very wide range of abstract and indexing periodicals, and other current periodicals treating the field (ATOM is one). Though not exhaustive, this guide will be of considerable use to researchers.
A digest of the proceedings of the 11th World Energy Conference — held in Munich in September 1980 and reported in ATOM 289, 289–291 — has now been published by the WEC Organising Committee.
The digest summarises and evaluates the results of the meeting and gives them a context.
In the words of the committee, the report of the Conservation Commission of the WEC and also the Survey of Energy Resources presented in Munich make it clear once again that the existing energy resources would certainly be sufficient to secure an adequate energy supply … for an increasing world population, provided they are appropriately developed and the potential of energy conservation is exploited effectively.
This will be achieved, however, only if determined and long–term orientated political actions are taken.
Over the past decade, the study of risk has benefited from the convergence of studies made in varying contexts and for different reasons. It is slowly beginning to be accepted as a suitable, indeed necessary, academic subject. This book is laid out to give contributions from many pioneers with a number of objectives, one being to assist students with typical examples from mining, offshore platforms, chemicals and industries other than nuclear.
The compilation of papers in this way causes a great deal of repetition — in treatment and in references. The British authors carry the shadow cast by the Flixborough Disaster and the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards. Indeed the title reflects this in talking of high risk when many examples are of industries where the risks under study are lower than one in 100 000 per year. Almost all the authors have some background in the nuclear industry with its special preoccupations with acceptability and its difficulties in communication. The authorities like Rasmussen, Okrent, Farmer, Kinchin, Kaiser, and Kletz are all there.
The book is aimed to influence designers, regulators and users in the industries chosen for study. The organisation of the sections causes difficulties in achieving this by the treatment of assessment methodology. It begins the analysis of risk by referring to installations where accidents could lead to severe consequences, and goes immediately into a discussion of reactor safety, bringing in Farmer (1967) on release of iodine–131 and Pugh (1969) on event trees in the study of the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor. Within twelve pages, the computer model of dispersion (TIRION) is introduced and in later chapters cloud behaviour is discussed many times but without indicating how variable the predictions must be.
The basis of such an analysis is reached after 250 pages, when ‘Learning from Experience’ introduces data banks and reliability measurement. Much of this takes nuclear power as an example and IEEE Std. 500–1977 as a guideline. This emphasis may arise from the expectation that the USA will provide the principal market for the book. Little else could explain the chapter on Europe by Vinck in the concluding section on Philosophy, Legislation and Standards. He deals exclusively with light water reactors and American codes, acknowledging IAEA and ISO Technical Committee 85.
There is one exception (p. 596) for other major hazard industries, severe consequences (say hundreds of dead) are associated with event frequencies of the order of 10-3–10-4 per installation year —
to be compared with the 10-6–10-7 ‘targets’ for nuclear
.
These event frequencies are accepted by Kletz (p. 333) if applied to a large unit of a chemical plant.
They are implicit in Kinchin’s curves (pp. 9 and 11) but hundreds of dead
have never been experiencedNOTE, only forecast by extrapolation or from some kind of LD50 predicted from a dispersion model.
It will be recalled that at the Windscale Inquiry the TIRION model was used to predict thousands of deaths by feeding in chosen values.
The book should be helpful to teachers of risk who have special knowledge in a particular area. It is probably a personal prejudice to regret that more emphasis is not placed on reliable manufacture using BSI handbook 22 on Quality Assurance. The reduction of risk begins with production of components guaranteed to conform to the performance and life expectancy set down in standards. It is continued by using hazard and operability studies which provide checks across engineering disciplines, independent auditing and the training of commissioning/operating crews by their involvement. This treatment could have been in and repetition out.
Nevertheless the book vividly illuminates a number of valuable procedures.
The new CEGB publication on generation costs is a welcome addition to the factual material available on this topic. In a foreword, Mr John Baker, a Member of the Board, sets out clearly the problems surrounding the presentation of costs. He draws particular attention to the fact, as we have done elsewhere1, 2 that cost figures are dependent on the methods of calculation and the rules employed, and that different methods are appropriate for different purposes.
In particular snap–shot year annual generation cost figures are no guide to future investment whether they be based on historic investment costs or inflation corrected costs, neither do such annual figures give any guidance on the merits of past investment decisions.
In looking at existing stations, the most meaningful assessment seeks to estimate the total costs in real terms of the station itself, its fuel and its operation, together with future costs of waste management and decommissioning, and to relate these to the total expected output of the station both past and future. Only the Generating Boards have the full data to do this, and they have now provided such calculations on the basis of two interest rates and alternative life assumptions for existing plant. The interest rates have been chosen by CEGB to represent the required rate of return on public investment (5 per cent) and the average rate of return on financial investment in the UK (2 per cent), both in real terms. The life–times have been taken as 25 years or 30 years, the Board now feeling that sufficient experience exists to give confidence that some extension can be achieved. On these assumptions, Magnox electricity costs, spread over the lifetime of the plants, range from around 10 per cent more than to some 20 per cent cheaper than coal.
| Major stations commissioned between 1965 and 1977 | Most recently commissioned stations | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Magnox | Coal | Oil | Hinkley Pt B | Drax 1st Half | |
| Capital charges incl. decommissioning | 0·84–1·41 | 0·23–0·40 | 0·57–0·79 | 0·64–1·14 | 0·24–0·43 |
| Inclusive fuel cost | 0·91–0·88 | 1·93–1·84 | 2·26–2·10 | 0·89–0·93 | 2·13–2·02 |
| Other Costs of Operation | 0·34 | 0·23–0·22 | 0·20–0·18 | 0·32 | 0·23–0·22 |
| Total Cost | 2·09–2·63 | 2·39–2·46 | 3·03–3·07 | 1·85–2·39 | 2·60–2·67 |
| Based on data from illustration IV and Appendix H(i) of CEGB Report | |||||
On a similar basis the Hinkley B AGR is expected to produce electricity at costs below those of the contemporary first half of the coal–fired station Drax B ; whilst AGR stations under construction, with the exception of Dungeness B, are expected to be marginally cheaper than the second half of Drax. Despite its much lower fuel and operating costs, which will fully justify its use from now on, the time and cost over–runs on Dungeness B construction are unlikely to be fully recouped over its lifetime through fossil fuel savings.NOTE
The figures presented in the document for new stations are based on the Sizewell Statement of Case data and restate the 33 per cent generating cost advantage foreseen for this plant. Most readers will find the pence/kWh figures easier to understand than the net effective cost presentation, although the latter is appropriate for comparing the systems costs of alternative investments. The expected fuel costs of a new coal station just equal the expected total unit costs of generation from the Sizewell PWR.
| Sizewell B | New AGR station | New coal station | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capital charges incl. decommissioning | 1·79 | 2·18 | 1·02 |
| Inclusive fuel cost | 0·58 | 0·76 | 2·60 |
| Other Costs of Operation | 0·24 | 0·21 | 0·26 |
| Total | 2·61 | 3·15 | 3·88 |
| Based on illustration VII of CEGB Report | |||
The Sizewell PWR margin of advantage is in the mid–range of figures calculated for new coal and nuclear stations for commissioning in Europe in 1990 and published last year by UNIPEDE3.
The illustrations described, including those of UNIPEDE, are based on central assumptions about future capital and fuel costs. The CEGB document includes data on the sensitivity of the comparisons to fuel cost changes, reprocessing costs for nuclear fuel and decommissioning costs.
Generating Costs — Assessment made in 1981 for plant to be commissioned in 1990, UNIPEDE Report to Brussels Congress, June 1982.
Rather than using the well worn phrase very readable
of Ian Blair’s book on nuclear power, I will compliment it by saying that I actually found myself reading it.
The normal technique when reviewing a book on a subject with which one is very familiar, and more particularly a subject on which one has also written not a little, is to flip through the topic headings to make a critical appraisal of how this writer has tackled them.
To find oneself reading rather than scanning substantial sections of the book is at first sight an inefficient use of time for a freelance writer, but on this occasion I can say that I learnt some things I did not know, I discovered some new ways of dealing with the arguments about nuclear power and, above all, I enjoyed myself.
A small criticism is the lack of an index which means that when going back to the book for something I recall reading I may again find myself reading substantial chunks while seeking what I wanted.
The book is acknowledged in the preface to be a very personal account of the nuclear industry and the author makes a virtue rather than an apology of the fact that the book is written by somebody earning his living in the industry. Having said that it should be noted that he was involved with the setting up in 1974 of the Energy Technology Support Unit at Harwell which, contrary to the criticisms of nuclear opponents, takes a very balanced view of all forms of energy production and conservation. As a result the chapter of the book dealing with nuclear power in the energy scene is very good and probably more generous to the alternatives than might be expected from a nuclear industry man.
In this chapter, Blair emphasises the fact that we have an oil crisis rather than an energy crisis. Most of our current problems are attributable to the fact that we became hooked on cheap oil in the 1950s and 1960s. It is this rather than competition from nuclear power that knocked out the coal industry, inhibited research and development on alternatives and eliminated incentives to save energy. For the future he develops the case for coal, conservation and nuclear power arguing that they will all be necessary. More specifically, by sensible application of known and economically viable conservation techniques, Blair considers that we ought to be able to achieve a 20 per cent reduction in our energy demand relative to what we might otherwise have used. But so far we have not been doing as well as is sometimes suggested by the flattening off in demand for energy — after attempting to disentangle the effects of energy conservation from economic stagnation, it is estimated that energy savings of something like 6 per cent, with an uncertainty of 4 per cent, have been achieved since the 1973 oil crisis.
In addition to the chapter on the energy scene, which addresses many of the questions raised in the nuclear debate, a good third of the book is devoted directly to the controversy mostly under the chapter heading, matters of public concern. It deals well with such matters as the biological effects of radiation, the probability and consequences of accidents, waste management and the fears about terrorism, civil liberties and proliferation. Having outlined his individual approach to these questions, Blair records some of his experiences as an active public speaker in presenting the arguments to the public. While some of the anecdotes verge on light–hearted indulgence, he does make the serious point about recognising in some people a deep rooted residual concern which remains after they have apparently been satisfied by the answers given on all the familiar issues. The basic problem, he suggests, is that these people can not articulate their concern. But neither, it would seem, can the author nor any of the other people who are striving so hard to generate a more rational public attitude towards nuclear power.
It would be nice to think that some of these concerned, and thoughtful members of the public will pick up Taming the Atom and perhaps find their own answers. If they get beyond the front cover, which is not wildly enticing, they will find in the first half of the book a very valuable aid to better understanding of nuclear power — the fascinating early history of nuclear discoveries, a scientifically accurate but easily digestible description of how it works and a ‘warts–and–all’ description of the development of the British nuclear industry.
The Dragon reactor still sits on its knoll at Winfrith, Dorset, dominating the view from the entry gate of the Atomic Energy Authority’s establishment — a monument to the 17 years collaboration of 13 nations. In Europe’s Nuclear Power Experience E N Shaw records the history of the project.
For much of its 17 year life the Dragon project was regarded as one of Europe’s most successful collaborations in applied science and certainly one of the most important in the field of nuclear energy.
It was created in 1959 under the aegis of OEEC’s European Nuclear Energy Agency (now the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD) when desire for a more politically integrated Western Europe was running strongly and nuclear energy was seen as the technical key to a better world.
The project was concerned with the design and construction of a new high temperature gas reactor (HTR) using helium and designed to produce higher temperatures than could be achieved with the first generation of reactors. The project produced a promising operating system and research in the USA, following the European lead, led to the construction of a demonstration plant. However, this was not followed by full commercial exploitation and the work in the USA was effectively abandoned.
By this time — the early 1970s — it became clear that at ministerial level Britain, France, and Italy were happy for the project to end and Germany was at the best apathetic. Britain had given up the HTR, France had become discouraged by the collapse of the General Atomic Company (GAC) contracts and Italy had abandoned interest in gas cooling. Germany had been thrown into confusion by GAC’s deficiencies and was gathering its resources around the pebble–bed once more. With the exception of Switzerland and to a lesser extent Sweden, no country in Europe wished to pursue the system.
This contrasted with the position at the working level. Dragon was unique and its forward programme was well supported. New rigs and experiments were ready for installation, the materials programme had extensive backing, and did studies on physics, safety and fuel cycles. But this was irrelevant. Dragon’s role was to serve the 13 countries and three of the biggest countries had decided Dragon no longer supported their national programmes. No other country was prepared to assume added financial responsibility to keep the project in being. So termination was logical.
The end for Dragon was untidy. The untidyness arose principally from a general unwillingness to see a successful collaboration come to an end. Countries preferred to let procedural delays in Brussels take their course during negotiation for an extension to the project, instead of coming to a clear decision to close. Had Dragon been a failure, either technically or politically, its demise might have been cleaner and kinder.
In the current climate the cost of the project, £47 million, would not be considered large.
In the words of the author Dragon demonstrated three cardinal virtues desirable in any international venture :
It was a successful political venture, it was a successful technical development and it was not immortal.
It is always so much easier to identify better decisions with the benefit of hindsight. The physicists at Oak Ridge National Laboratory knew that the tentative 1965 doses, designated T65D, for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors needed further refinement, even though they were a substantial improvement over the earlier estimates. But other priorities were pressing, the budget was tight and good progress could be made with the T65D values ; so the programme of refinement effectively stopped. That was a mistake.
It was inevitable that the mistake would be revealed as the passage of time unfolded the epidemiological results from the population of bomb survivors. The group from Hiroshima were the only human population exposed to substantial neutron doses, and much attention therefore focussed on the differences between the two cities. Perhaps the chequered history of the BEIR III report best illustrates the confusion and uncertainty in interpreting the so gradual accumulation of sparse data. The resolution of these problems was bound to include a critical examination of the dosimetry, but it was not until 1980 that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory showed that improving the estimates of radiation dose could have a substantial effect on the interpretation of the evidence provided by the bomb survivors.
It will be a year or two yet before all the components of the revised analysis are in place. Those who wish to follow the detailed progress of revision will find the proceedings of the symposium held at Germantown in September 1981 a fascinating example of the scientific method at work. Following a review of the early work eleven paper were presented on all aspects of the problem : the yields of the two weapons ; the attenuation of the consequent radiation in air ; the delayed radiation from the fireball ; the effects of buildings, self–shielding, and radiation quality ; and the inferences that can be drawn.
The symposium made it very clear that much evaluation remains to be done so that it is too early to reach any firm conclusions. There are indications that the revision will tend to bring the results from the two cities into further agreement, and that the neutron dose at Hiroshima will become less significant. This latter point is of considerable practical importance, since the Hiroshima survivors have been the only substantial human population exposed to neutrons. If the effect of that exposure becomes invisible under the revised dosimetry then neutron protection standards will have to be derived entirely from non–human evidence. There was widespread agreement that the risk factor for gamma rays would not be changed by more than a factor of two, a factor within the uncertainties of the present risk estimates. This is consistent with estimates based on the available data excluding that from the bomb survivors.
With that tentative indication the world of radiological protection will have to be content until the calculations in hand are completed.
major hazard industry, despite its history of mass casualty accidents.