Book Reviews from ATOM — 1982

1981 • 1983

Number 303, January

This long–awaited report will be seen by many as a companion volume to the sixth report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, which dealt with nuclear power and the environment.* It provides a clear and well–written account of the present state and future prospects of the technology of the coal industry and coal utilisation ; it reviews the state of knowledge on environmental impacts, including those on health, crops, property and world climate, and apart from one or two mild reservations the authors conclude that the present situation is generally satisfactory.

As a basis for their quantitative conclusions the Commission have taken a Department of Energy low growth case (1 per cent p.a. growth in GDP to 2000) which leads them to a coal demand of 125 million tonnes in 2000, assuming 22 gigawatts (electrical) of nuclear capacity at that time. Against this background they review the prospects for UK and world coal supplies and comment on trends in production costs and prices.

The text discusses the occupational hazards of mining and points to the considerable improvements that have taken place over the years in both accident levels and pneumoconiosis (figs. 1 and 2).

The general impacts of mining operations on the environment are summarised, including the effects of spoil tips, of drainage and washing operations, of noise and of subsidence. On the latter the Commission recommend that additional compensation should be payable allowing for loss of property value as well as the currently covered loss of repair (Table 1). Both this problem and spoil tipping are matters giving rise to considerable local concern and the Commission examines ways of improving on the present situation. Unfortunately some techniques such as backstowing of spoil are not well matched to modern mining techniques.

The problems arising from mine closure might be considered to parallel the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Environmental restoration would now be expected and is practiced, although the coal industry has a legacy of past activity that is still being worked upon with the assistance of grants under the local Employment and Local Government acts.

The section of the report dealing with coal use points to the present dominance of coal in electricity generation and of electricity generation as a use for coal. The Commission reports that the expectation that coal will quadruple its share of industrial markets by 2000 is not generally recognised by local authorities.

Following a brief discussion of coal transport and its impacts and of synthetic natural gas production, the report looks at current and future combustion technology in power stations, industry and the home. The quantities of pollutants, mainly smoke and sulphur dioxide, are reviewed and likely future levels discussed.

The greatest interest outside the industry is likely to focus on the effects of pollutants on people and the general environment. The situation is complex because of the difficulty of allowing for the much greater effects of cigarette smoking, the long lags involved before chronic impacts are seen, and the understanding of the specific role of individual pollutants and their interactions. Figure 3 presents the acute effects as a function of smoke and sulphur dioxide concentration (para. 18.12 of the report). Current winter average levels of smoke and sulphur dioxide in the cities in the UK are perhaps 40 μg m^-3 and 100 μg m^-3 respectively. Not all of this is due to coal burning and only a small part of it due to power stations (paras. 17.12, 17.41). Because of the complexity of the problem (18.15) no attempt is made to estimate the extra numbers of deaths resulting from chronic bronchitis or emphysema that can be attributed to air pollutants. This is in contrast to the approaches adopted in the United States by, amongst others, the American Medical Association, who attempt to quantify the consequences of chronic exposure (see, for example, Sir John Hill’s paper, Risk v. Benefit, ATOM 293, March 1981).

The question of excess deaths is examined for lung cancer, however, and here from correlation with benzo[a]pyrene levels it is concluded that the present contribution from coal combustion is unlikely to account for more than 100–200 cases a year (paras. 18.25, 18.32.).

For the purpose of comparison, ATOM readers will know that the nuclear industry adds about 0·3 millirem per year to the average population radiation dose, which is less than 0·2 per cent of the natural background level averaging in the UK about 186 mrem per year. These natural levels are a thousand times less than those at which large doses of radiation delivered over a short period have been observed to cause early deaths. If linear dose response relationships are assumed, it can be calculated that the activity of the nuclear industry might lead to one fatal cancer per year in the UK, and this may be an over–estimate. This would appear to be comparable to the figure for enhanced cancer incidence due to coal burning in UK power stations, relative to energy output.

The radioactive emissions from coal–fired power stations are discussed in this report, which concludes that in terms of resultant radiation dose to the public these are comparable with the very small amounts arising from the normal operation of present nuclear power stations, including emissions from the nuclear fuel reprocessing cycle ; in both cases, the average dose equivalent received by members of the public is far less than the natural variations in the annual dose received from all natural sources (paras 17.36, 18.31).

The effects of pollution on crops and property are generally considered by the Commission to be less serious. Crop damage costs of £23 million a year in the UK are cited for the worst conditions, and £130 million of corrosion damage (metalwork only considered) might be avoided by a reduction of 40 per cent in sulphur dioxide emissions (paras. 18.40, 18.53). The costs of greater sulphur dioxide emission control would be considerable, and would for example add some 10 per cent to coal–fired electricity generation costs (paras. 17.70–17.73). Total costs in the UK might rise to £195–330 million per year and a recent figure for the EEC as a whole has been set at £5 000 million per year (para. 18.44). Such moves might affect acid rain and reduce crop damage and corrosion, though whether the benefits would exceed the costs is not explored in the report.

Not surprisingly the question of carbon dioxide production and the greenhouse effect is discussed. The views of Sir John Mason are quoted, as supporting a 2°–3° rise in average global temperature over the next 50 years or so, and a 5–7 per cent increase in precipitation (para. 18.55). The economic and social effects of such changes are difficult to predict, although one cited source refers to carbon dioxide as one of the most important contemporary environmental problems which threatens the stability of climates world–wide and therefore the stability of all nations. The Commission concludes that it would be premature to do more than note the potential importance of the issue and that research is being carried out to clarify the problems.

Overall, the Commission feel that the environmental and social costs of energy provision to an industrial society are far outweighed by the rising standard of living and reduced mortality from other causes (para. 22.6). Their initial expectation that their study of coal and environment would throw up a picture highlighting deleterious effects had, in the event, provided a reassuring and more promising picture (para. 22.3).

In their final chapter the Commission explore the problems of reconciling divergent interests through the planning process. An energy infrastructure is seen as vital to national prosperity and ways must be found to enable developments to proceed and to do so in a timely manner (para. 21.10). To assist this, the Commission call for the Government to encourage greater debate on the energy options, and they make specific proposals which they believe would ease the planning process, achieve greater consensus and speed local planning inquiries. Some of these proposals could prove helpful to all interested parties. It is particularly interesting to note that they have come out against two–stage inquiries dealing with national and local issues separately (para. 21.60) and that they favour continuation of the present flexible UK approach to environmental impact assessment over the more formal mandatory requirements called for in the United States.

* The Commission on Energy and the Environment, like the RCEP at the time of its sixth report, was chaired by Lord Flowers, FRS.

Number 305, March

This publication, commissioned by the Association for the Conservation of Energy, urges the Government to invest directly in a large–scale programme of energy conservation in the domestic sector. The report starts with a review of UK energy policy, and argues that Government policy relies largely upon raising energy prices and that investment in conservation has not received the attention it deserves. A comparison of OECD conservation budgets for 1979 shows that UK Government expenditure on energy conservation in the domestic sector was very substantially lower than in France and Germany. However, the authors appear to misinterpret Government policy, which is not simply to raise prices but rather through this mechanism to reduce the nationalised fuel industries’ borrowing requirements.^NOTE

The authors suggest that the UK is unlikely to be self–sufficient in oil much beyond the end of 1990 and that real price increases of 75–100 per cent (in terms of US dollars) can be expected by the end of the century. They emphasise that major changes in patterns of energy production and consumption take a very long time to implement, and urge that conservation programmes should be introduced without delay. On the basis of information published by the Watt Committee, the British Gas Corporation, the International Institute for Environment and Development and others, the paper assesses the energy savings which might be achieved. Four measures of domestic insulation (cavity wall and roof insulation, draught proofing and double glazing) together with adequate control systems could halve the heat loss of a typical inter–war semi–detached dwelling. The report recommends a 17–year programme to upgrade half a million dwellings per year which have deficient insulation, and claims that this could lead to a 1·5 per cent saving in the UK primary energy demand rising to 3 per cent in the longer term. However, as the authors point out, temperatures within dwellings are likely to increase as incomes rise, so that in the event some of the benefits might be taken as increased comfort level.

Financial returns

A major plank in the authors’ case for investment in domestic energy conservation is that it provides a better financial return than investment in new power stations. However, they seem to be unaware that thermal insulation of dwellings and new power stations are not mutually exclusive options. Electricity is used in dwellings mainly for lighting and appliances, and its market share in space heating is only about 10 per cent, much of this provided by off–peak supplies. The main impact of domestic thermal insulation would be to reduce fossil fuel consumption, and incidentally to raise the average temperature within dwellings as mentioned above. The electricity industry has been marketing the concept of electric space heating in conjunction with improved insulation levels for some years. The reason for this is that electric space heating involves a low capital cost, high–efficiency appliance with high fuel costs which competes well in insulated dwellings with relatively low heating demands. A national programme for the insulation of dwellings would improve the competitive position of electricity and, in long terms, could well lead to an increase in market share and consumption of electricity. There is no doubt that some conservation measures, such as loft and cavity wall insulation, are highly cost effective and merit encouragement ; however, the report’s financial case for conservation (which is strong in its own right) is not helped by linking it to the fallacy that the insulation of dwellings can reduce the need for new power stations.

Obstacles to conservation

The various factors inhibiting investment in domestic energy conservation are discussed. These include a lack of awareness of the benefits ; the difficulty of recovering the full costs at sale ; and the absence of incentive for owners of rented property to invest in conservation measures. The authors conclude that it is recognised that when the social returns to an activity exceed the private then there is, on the grounds of economic efficiency, a strong case for a subsidy to this activity. In addition they point out that a major investment programme would have the added advantage of creating thousands of new jobs. However, schemes do exist to encourage loft insulation, and the Government’s Energy Conservation Demonstration Projects Scheme is aimed at developing conservation technology. It should be recognised also that the very short payback criteria often adopted would mean that large Government subsidies might be needed to achieve substantial cost savings.

It is a pity that this useful review of the potential for domestic energy conservation has been marred by misleading comparison with the cost of nuclear power, and a misinterpretation of Government energy pricing policy. A more balanced view would be to consider nuclear power, coal and conservation as complements (rather than substitutes) in matching energy supply and demand as oil and gas supplies decline.

* A trade group supported by Cape Industries, Honeywell Control Systems, Wimpey Laboratories, Kleeneze Industries and Tarmac.

Number 306, April

Constructive and objective contributions to the energy debate are always welcome. Even contributions that are less than objective can be helpful if they expose areas of confusion and lead directly or indirectly to clarification and better understanding.

The pamphlet of the above title starts with selected published statements critical of the nuclear industry or the presentation of the nuclear case, taken from familiar sources ; it adds to the debate by converting historic generating costs into present day price levels ; it puts forward its own hypotheses and views on future costs and the factors affecting them ; and finally it draws conclusions based on these hypotheses which it uses as the basis for a series of recommendations. The most startling of these is the immediate abandonment of the construction of Torness and Heysham II.

The report describes its authors* as the Committee for the Study of the Economics of Nuclear Electricity, a committee chaired by Sir Kelvin Spencer and consisting of a small group of academics uncommitted to any particular source of primary energy. The authors set out to be objective but objectivity means different things to different people, as anyone who can stand back from any highly polarised discussion will observe.

The line of argument followed by the authors starts by contrasting present nuclear plans with the current excess of generating capacity. The report proceeds to criticise past planning and nuclear plant performance. It attacks the fraud inherent in all inflationary accounting and sets out its own preferred method of comparing current nuclear and fossil fuelled generating costs, together with its own assumptions for the future. Finally having put forward an analysis which reveals an unassailable economic case against nuclear power, it looks at other unknown costs which when taken into account makes nuclear power’s future bankrupt.

It is valid for critics of the nuclear industry to point, as this pamphlet does, to its past errors and problems and to use these to question the reliance to be put on its present perceptions. It is less than objective, however, not to set these in context and to assume that no lessons have been learned. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, for example, thought that CEGB demand forecasting had significantly improved. It is also important that objective critics anxious to gain credibility state facts correctly. The document being reviewed falls short of these ideals.

Thus the pamphlet is less than accurate in attributing to the Secretary of State an announcement that the Generating Boards should embark on a 15 GE nuclear power programme. From the outset it has been made clear that any ordering and construction programme would be subject to evolving perceptions of need and on the initiative of the Boards themselves. It is also wrong in implying any government committment to a specific reactor type. There is an argument that such committment and a firm ordering pattern could be desirable and beneficial but this has certainly not been the UK government’s position or that of the Generating Boards.

Electricity forecasts

The fact that electricity forecasts, like most others made in the 1960s and 1970s, were consistently over–optimistic is a matter of record. In part such over–estimates, of all sorts, stemmed from over–confidence in the ability of the UK economy to match that of its competitors. What would have happened if Government hopes had been realised while the public utilities had erred consistently on the side of pessimism? What lessons should we learn for the future? Should we accept that the world recession, which followed sharp increases in oil prices in 1973, has permanently diminished economic growth prospects to near zero and plan accordingly ; or should we recognise that, just as today’s sustained low growth was unthinkable less than a decade ago, so extrapolation of present pessimism into the future may seriously understate prospects?

Any upsurge in the world economy would rapidly bring pressure on all forms of energy, particularly oil, and lead to increases in the price of fuels. This will put a brake on growth unless we reduce dependence on fossil fuels, as France has been doing. The UK is fortunate in its fossil fuel resources, but it cannot isolate itself from world economic pressures. If world prices rise our coal and oil become even more valuable.

Sir Kelvin Spencer’s Committee does not look at such a situation but takes one view of the future, based on modest economic growth and high energy conservation, with a 50 per cent or more fall in electricity consumption. (Conclusion 11.5). The likelihood of such a combination, let alone its practical feasibility, is not examined by the authors. Most observers expect electricity to continue increasing its share of energy markets and would see a strategy based on reliance on achieving high levels of conservation as extremely risky. Even if electricity growth were relatively slow there is likely to be an increasing need for new plant in the 1990s as existing stations reach the end of their useful lives and have to be retired.

Again, the fact that the performance of the UK’s gas–cooled reactors has fallen below the initial expectations of the design stage and that the AGR programme has been beset by a variety of problems, leading to lengthy time and cost over–runs, is well known. The reasons are well understood and steps have been taken to avoid a repetition. The report gives little credit for these.

Nuclear costs

This brings me to the crux of the document which is an attack on published nuclear costs, their method of calculation and the assumptions underlying them. There are several ways of presenting generating costs, all of which are equally correct. However, the assumptions need to be made clear and they should be matched to their context. Some of these approaches are described below :

1. From an investment standpoint the Boards wish to know how the future options open to them are likely to compare. To do this they can calculate estimated future expenditure on building the plant and operating it and on buying its fuel over its lifetime. This is then divided by the expected lifetime electrical output to arrive at a cost per unit output.
   Because capital and fuel costs differ for different types of plant the costs are spread differently over time, discounting procedures are used to allow for the fact that £1 today is worth more in real terms than £1 tomorrow.* Suitable additions to costs are made to take account of future waste management and reactor decommissioning. These calculations give a fixed cost in constant money of producing a unit of electricity from a single power station against specified assumptions, sometimes called a levelised cost.
2. The Boards are more concerned with the effect of additional capacity on their grid system and this calls for detailled modelling using the characteristics of stations already in the system and some assumptions about demand growth and future station ordering. The overall cost of operating the system may be raised or lowered by the additional capacity, depending on whether the total generating costs of the new station are less or greater than the fuel and operating savings made by displacing output from existing plant. The net effective cost is the net cost to the systm of inserting a new plant spread over that plant’s life (measured in discounted present worth terms and expressed per kW p.a. of added capacity). The levelised unit costs of electricity from the station can be calculated using the electrical output over the station’s life predicted by the model.
3. By contrast, the cost of producing electricity at an existing plant is the actual performance and accounting cost for a given year. It varies from year to year depending on the achieved electrical output. If there were no such thing as inflation or technical progress the situation would be relatively simple. Generating costs could be regarded as requal to fuel and operating costs plus some capital allowance, all divided by the net electrical input over the year in question. The method of treating capital is arbitrary. If it was written off immediately generating costs would be equal to the fuel and operating costs only. Alternatively capital can be recovered by straight line depreciation (with equal annual capital and falling interest payments as outstanding capital declines) or by constant sum annuities (with increasing capital and decreasing interest content repayments), spread like a mortgage over the station life or any shorter period selected.^NOTE In practice the Boards calculate operating costs with station capital plus interest annuitised over the planned life (20 years for Magnox). Additional sums are added to the figures presented to allow for future expenditure on reprocessing, waste management and decommissioning. The Boards’ comparative annual generating costs represent the costs to them of repaying with interest the cash spent on the station, plus the cost of fuel, plus allowances for future expenditure.
4. All the methods described above relate to the costs as seen by the Boards. From the national standpoint a Government might wish to take in other factors, some of which can be reflected in monetary terms. Thus the real cost of resources may be judged to differ from market prices because of balance of payments, employment or environmental concerns. If such factors are introduced national resource costs or welfare costs can be derived for appraisals of future investment or annual generating costs. These figures are not derived or used by the Generating Boards or by Sir Kelvin Spencer’s committee.

These then are basic approaches. The pamphlet from Sir Kelvin Spencer’s Committee accepts the forward investment appraisal approach (1 and 2 above) but disputes the quantitative input assumptions used by the Boards. It rejects the annual cost figures published by the Boards which it regards as misleading because of inflation. I will deal with these points in reverse order.

As explained above (under 3) the Board’s annual costs allow for repayment with interest of cash spent. If monetary interest rates in the past had been sufficient to maintain the value of capital and provide the required return in real terms, there would be no grounds for difference. However, this has not been the case and Sir Kelvin and his colleages argue that if Magnox and coal costs incurred in the past were escalated in line with inflation and a real return of 5 per cent was called for, then both Magnox and coal fired annual generation costs would appear more expensive, with Magnox becoming dearer than coal, rather than cheaper as shown in CEGB figures. This is, of course, true ; but is it relevant?

The pamphlet says that CEGB should be asking itself If coal stations had been built instead of Magnox stations and the value of money had been stable or the accounts properly corrected for inflation, would electricity have been cheaper or dearer? Whilst deceptively simple, the question is loaded, ambiguous and not answered by Sir Kelvin and his colleagues.

The question is loaded because it suppresses the fact that, in the absence of nuclear, oil fired plant would have made up some of the capacity — and that is now a very expensive option.

The question is ambiguous because it fails to say by whom cheapness or dearness is viewed and whether over station life or in annual cost terms. Is it cost to the Boards and the electricity user or to the nation as a whole? If the former, which I think the authors have in mind, then are the interest rates used in the CSENE report’s calculations appropriate? Should the 5 per cent real return on inflated capital be replaced by public sector loan fund rate less inflation or by the real rate of return the Boards or their customers might have earned on any money saved by opting for less capital intensive plant? If the latter, the national perspective, is required, the 5 per cent interest rate would be suitable, but the input costs would all have to be reassessed on the basis of the same criteria and coal prices, nuclear fuel prices, etc., would all be different ; a feature which is not introduced into the pamphlet’s calculations.

On the matter of the answer to the Committee’s question, first let me restate that the Board’s figures, presented as they are in historic cost terms, represent the annual cash costs to them of fuelling and operating their stations and repaying past investment with interest. They are presented for coal, oil and nuclear stations of comparable age which have lived through the inflation of similar years. Nevetheless, they do not answer the question put by Sir Kelvin. However, neither do the numbers he and his colleagues put forward. Leaving aside the question of the selected interest rate mentioned earlier and the corrected costs for coal and other inputs, there is the larger question of whether it is sensible to assume that in the absence of the nuclear alternative coal prices would have remained the same, as is implicitly assumed by Sir Kelvin and his colleagues.

Sir Kelvin’s simple question is unanswerable. The Board’s figures give a picture of the annual generating cost to them in cash terms, showing nuclear to be costing them less now. They do not claim that this is a guide to future investment, nor that it is a full reflection of national resource costs. The CSENE pamphlet provides figures that show roughly what generating costs to the Boards might now be, had money always had its present value, had the Boards been charged 5 per cent p.a. real interest return on capital, and had coal prices remained the same regardless of the absence of competition and additional resource depletion. This says nothing about whether investment in coal as opposed to Magnox would have proved cheaper, it offers no guidance on national investment and it says nothing about national resource costs.

The more important part of the pamphlet reproduces material on net effective costs provided by Professor Jeffery, the Group’s consultant, which, it is claimed, shows that coal is likely to be cheaper than nuclear for future electricity generation. What Professor Jeffery, and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission before him, have done is to highlight the sensitivity of forward cost calculations to input assumptions, particularly on fossil fuel real price trends. The authors put up a set of assumptions alternative to those of the CEGB, with arguments as to why they prefer them.

Unfortunately a number of errors and misconceptions creep into the text. For example, after criticising CEGB assumptions about coal price increase, they claim that if coal prices are held steady up to 1986–7 the net effective costs (NEC) for nuclear plant change from -£20/kW p.a. to +£31/kW p.a. This is wrong. This change in NEC requires that coal prices remain constant not for 4 or 5 years but for 30 years, throughout the stations’ life to 2011 or 2012. In the long run coal prices must follow production cost trends and something like 2 per cent p.a. escalation in real terms is widely expected.

The authors are also wrong on nuclear fuel costs. Professor Jeffery has been in correspondence with me for some time and provided details of his calculations. It is evident that his method of revising future costs, on the basis of inflating Hinkley B fuel costs, falls into the trap of forgetting that both uranium ore and separative work costs have not risen in line with inflation. This factor alone inflates his future generating cost estimate by about 0·4p/kWh. Unfortunately this was not realised until after publication of the CSENE document. The reference to French opinion to support high fuel cycle costs is at variance with their actual claims, which recently gave inclusive fuel costs for 1991 at 0·5 p/kWh (Jan 1982), well below those of 0·61 p/kWh (March 1980) used by CEGB in their net effective cost calculations.

Again, based on Magnox and earlier AGR construction experience, the report argues that CEGB allowances for time and cost over–runs are inadequate. However, they then quote an allowance of 30 per cent for cost over–run without pointing out that this is additional to the CEGB existing allowance of 17½ per cent, which they cite earlier. On this basis they are proposing more than a 50 per cent over–run rather than 30 per cent, despite the moves the Boards have taken to limit future difficulties.

Amongst other things therefore the pamphlet produces no evidence to show how their coal price assumptions will be fulfilled ; and they appear over pessimistic in calculations of likely nuclear fuel costs and on capital cost escalation. Their nuclear generating costs and NEC calculations have to be considered unrealistic and provide little guidance on future nuclear and fossil electricity costs.

It is also important to note that their generating cost figures cited in p/kWh are for the year of commissioning only (1986–7) and not average lifetime costs. They therefore differ from those provided by CEGB in their NEC calculations.

Following its treatment of costs the report goes on to deal qualitatively with a number of other aspects of nuclear energy generation. It is less than honest in seeking to imply that decommissioning and waste management costs are excluded from the published annual and future costs calculations. They are already included. It is less than objective in its questioning of the potential nuclear contribution. The 5 million tonnes of world uranium resources usually taken as known are equivalent to 10 million million tonnes of coal in primary energy terms and broadly comparable to the world’s coal resources.

The treatment of pollution from coal burning and the confidence in conservation are in marked contrast to their approach to nuclear generation. Their comments on cost–effectiveness of investment in domestic energy conservation and electricity supply ignore the fact that the real trade off is between conservation and fossil fuel burning. Better insulation could well increase the attractiveness of electricity to the user.

The conclusions and recommendations reached by the authors are dependent on the validity of their calculations. Sufficient has been said to show that these cannot be regarded as reliable and the conclusions based on them therefore fall.

Without producing supporting evidence they assert that massive conservation could halve electricity generating requirements. They favour development of small, fluidised–bed, pollution–controlled, coal–fired CHP schemes and renewable energy sources. The development of knowledge and, where practicable, schemes for improved conservation or deployment of economically and environmentally acceptable alternative energy sources, is to be welcomed. But the report itself contains nothing to justify reliance on them in preference to nuclear power.

The report of Sir Kelvin’s committee may have attempted to use straightforward, unprejudiced methods… based on conservative assumptions and they may feel that their conclusions are those to which anyone could come who had recourse to the same background material. As I have sought to point out they have probed in insufficient depth and themselves present an incomplete and misleading analysis which, regrettably, is of little value to anyone wishing to have a better understanding of the nuclear costs question. What is brought out is the need for those of us in the nuclear industry to make even clearer the nature of the assumptions we make and the basis on which they are made. Costing studies for new reactors or plant are major exercises related to specific designs and tend to be related to major decisions or inquiries (Thermal Reactor Assessment, Windscale Inquiry, Sizewell Inquiry) with intermediate inflation corrected revisions. For this reason a detailed rebuttal of Sir Kelvin Spencer and his group will have to await the revised figures being prepared for the Sizewell Inquiry by the CEGB.

* Sir Kelvin Spencer, R. Marshall, C. Sweet, M. Prior, I. Welsh, P. Bunyard, E. Goldsmith, N. Hildyard.
* In principle today’s £1 could be invested to yield £(1+r) in t years if fractional interest was r per annum — thus £s spent or earned in t years’ time are reduced to present equivalent worth by dividing by (1/r)^t. This has nothing to do with inflation and all sums are done in constant money terms. r is currently taken as 0·05 for public sector investment in the UK.

The authors of this booklet are to be congratulated on a very lucid and readable presentation of the principles underlying the methods most widely being considered for the eventual disposal of highly radioactive waste arising from nuclear power generation. The illustrations are particularly well–designed and one can obtain much of the story from them without recourse to the text. The booklet is based on a previous publication, in Swedish, by the senior author Ulf Lindblom who was one of the geological consultants to the Nuclear Fuel Safety Project (KBS) study undertaken for the Swedish power industry in response to the requirement placed on the latter by the Swedish Parliament, to show that there was a safe method of dealing permanently with wastes arising from nuclear power generation. Paul Gnirk has been a consultant both to the Swedish study and to the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd study of high–level waste repositories in geological formations. The Swedish study is one of the most complete examinations of the question by a wide range of scientists from within and without the Swedish industry.

The book deals with waste in the form of spent nuclear fuel and vitrified highly–active reprocessing waste, both suitably encapsulated in high–integrity containers.

One of the very few criticisms that might be made concerns the illustration of the familiar plot showing how the toxic content of reprocessed waste decreases with the passage of time and comparison of this with toxic content of the quantity of ore required to produce the fuel involved. Without the details concerning the proportion of the actinide elements assumed to be included in the waste, it is difficult to compare the curve with other published computations. However, it seems likely that the values of toxic content were calculated before the 1980 ICRP revision of its recommended maximum permissible levels in water for certain radionuclides. Recalculation using the waste composition usually expected from a reprocessing plant, and the revised ICRP recommendations, would show that it would be several thousand years before the total toxic content of the vitrified reprocessed waste equalled that of the ore that was mined. However, the message is still essentially the same ; initially the waste is potentially very hazardous indeed but after the passage of a few thousand years the hazard is no greater than that of the naturally occurring ore. Many experts question whether this comparison is worth using because the assumptions on which it is based and the limitations are so frequently misunderstood. As the authors pointed out, this relative danger index takes no account of the probability of man’s exposure to the radionuclides and a proper measure of actual risk requires a detailed analysis of all the means by which they could return to man from a repository and the features in a properly selected system that would block their path. The remainder of the book deals with just these points.

The various schemes that have been suggested from time to time for dealing with these highly–active wastes are very briefly covered with comments indicating some of the reasons why they may be rejected in most cases. Attention in the book is almost wholly devoted to the method that, together with disposal on or under the deep ocean bed, is receiving greatest attention world–wide, viz. the emplacement of solidified wastes, suitably packaged in repositories mined into deep rock formations.

The genesis, occurrence and structure of hard rocks — a term used collectively to cover various crystalline rocks including granite — and salt formations are explained. These formations are notably the ones of greatest interest in Sweden, Canada and in the US. These formations are also of particular interest in Germany where salt formations are the main consideration, and France and the UK, where the hard rock formation is of interest. Several sections then deal at some length with hydrology and hydrogeology of rock formations since the main mechanism by which it is conceivable that radioactive constituents of deeply buried waste could reach man’s environment is dissolution of the waste in ground water which subsequently finds its way to the surface. The factors that control quantity and speed of flow of ground water in rocks both before and after the construction of a repository and the effect of heat generated by the waste on ground water flow are discussed. The effects of possible future climatic changes are also indicated.

The authors then discuss the eventual release of radionuclides from the waste when the container corrodes, and the features of the repository that would control the subsequent movement of the dissolved components of waste, initially through the packing material immediately surrounding the waste, and finally through the rock formation in which the repository had been placed. The consequences of disruption by natural forces and by human intrusion are also considered.

The authors conclude that, provided attention is given to the various features outlined in the book, it is possible to site a repository so that even in the worst situation involving early exposure of the waste form to circulating ground waters it appears highly unlikely that any radionuclides could migrate from the repository to the ground surface in less than a few thousand years. It is much more likely that the travel times will be of the order of tens of thousands of years. … Even if radionuclides reach the surface of the earth in a relatively short time, the concentrations will most likely be below hazardous levels.

The book raises interesting comparisons of the differing strategies for disposal of high–level, heat emitting waste in the UK, Sweden and the US. The reader will note that in the section on disturbance of the natural temperature in the rock, the Swedish disposal concept in granite envisages pre–disposal storage of waste containers at the earth’s surface for 40 years to allow heat output to decay whereas the United States plans for disposal of spent fuel in salt formations require at least 10 years of pre–disposal cooling in surface stores.

In the UK scientists have long advocated several decades, at least, of pre–cooling in engineered stores (see, for example, L.E.J. Roberts, Policy and Perspective, ATOM 267). The recent Government statement extends this period even further. All these possible strategies could result in a safe means of managing highly–active nuclear waste, but call for different arrangements to meet the requirement that no unacceptable changes of the rock or waste will result. The main consequences of deferred disposal are : reduction in cost of the repository since canisters could be more closely packed, and a reduction in the rates of corrosion of containers and leaching of waste, thereby decreasing still further the quantity of radionuclides that might migrate eventually to the earth’s surface. Meanwhile there are no difficulties in providing stores in which the packaged wastes can be monitored and their safety assured.

Research is continuing in Sweden and the results will presumably add even greater weight to the general conclusions that have already been drawn concerning feasibility of disposal into mined repositories. The hard rock formations to which the book refers are the very ancient Pre–Cambrian shield roscks which have remained unchanged for the past 600 million years. There are no directly corresponding rocks in the UK, so that eventually it would be necessary to conduct studies specific to the most appropriate rocks in this country before any site was chosen for a repository.

The booklet is recommended reading for anyone who wishes to understand the technical issues underlying the safety of the disposal of nuclear waste deep underground.

The National Radiological Protection Board has published a study in which the potential radiological consequences of disposing of two types of intermediate level waste by one of the methods currently under consideration have been calculated. The objective of the study is to provide interim guidance on the standard of treatment and packaging required for this type of disposal. The study also indicated the research needed to assess this method of disposal comprehensively, and allows a very limited comparison to be made of disposal in clay and shale formations.

The NRPB notes that intermediate level wastes — such as spent ion exchange resins, fuel element cladding and the like, contaminated with a variety of radionuclides — have been produced in the UK since the beginning of the nuclear power programme. Unlike high level wastes they do not emit heat ; but comparatively large volumes are stored at nuclear sites, mostly in the form in which they were produced.

The selection of methods for managing such wastes — treatment, packaging and disposal — is becoming a matter of increasing priority. For this reason considerable research is now being devoted to intermediate waste management.

The study now published is the first in a series intended to facilitate decisions on intermediate level waste management. It was funded partly by the UK Department of the Environment, and uses waste inventory information provided by the nuclear industry. Further studies will consider other types of waste and other disposal options.

Number 307, May

This report was prepared by R.A.D. Ferguson at the Energy Centre, University of Newcastle–upon–Tyne, on a contract from the UKAEA. As pointed out in the preface by G.R. Bainbridge, Professor of Energy Studies at the University, the study was undertaken on the undersanding that the university was free to obtain and evaluate data from all available sources for impartial consideration, and the result is an objective and meticulously cautious review and appraisal of the available evidence.

Ferguson points out that the assessment of comparative risk is only one contribution to the general study of the merits of alternative energy systems and he stresses repeatedly the considerable uncertainty and qualification that necessarily surround much of the data in the field of health impacts and its interpretation.

The study consists of a review of existing data concerning fatalities and health effects, both immediate and delayed, resulting from all facets of the production of fuels and their use for generating electricity. The three fuels considered are coal, oil and uranium and the nuclear reactor chosen for comparison purposes is the AGR.

Very properly the study starts out with the impacts of mining coal or uranium or recovering oil and proceeds through the fuel handling stages and transportation, to the effects of the emissions during combustion and subsequent waste disposal.

The author has taken the view that fatalities and health effects cannot be added and is careful to keep the risks associated with various phases of activity distinct. The end result is a set of figures which Ferguson feels represent reasonable ranges for occupational and public impacts of accident and disease which he concludes represent a low risk for all three of the energy sources. The summary of risks is reproduced here. The author’s admonitions concerning the uncertainties must be stressed and the figures should only be used in connection with the appropriate caveats if one is to ensure that they are not misinterpreted and do not mislead.

The study is a good one and contains a very useful review of the problems of attempting to establish meaningful figures for risk levels. Ferguson points to the inevitably arbitrary nature of the choice of units. The answers will differ depending upon whether they are expressed per unit of electrical output or per worker employed in the industry and can be affected by such things as the load factors acheived with different types of plant. The author prefers and uses the unit of electrical output which directly relates the risk figures to the end product and the benefits received by its users.

The problems of assessing risks for each of the three different fuels are separately considered. Thus, there are lags in the incidence of certain types of a disease resulting from exposure to mining dusts or to radiation ; there are problems with the decision on whether to accept the view that there is a threshold below which the incidence of death and disease is likely to be negligible, or whether linear dose–response relationships should be assumed ; and there is insufficient evidence in the author’s opinion on oil rig accidents or large nuclear accidents to allow a definitive attribution of risk per unit of electricity, although he does show that the available information on risks from nuclear accidents sets these at very low levels.

Having considered the separate cases, Ferguson opts to accept the view that there is a threshold for smoke/SO₂ effects from fossil fuel burning, but follows the linear dose–response relationship for radiation effects, though recognising that the latter probably over–states the risks. This choice may not be altogether logical on the basis of the evidence cited by Ferguson, since the only support for assuming a threshold in the one case is the absence of observed or detectable effects, which is an argument that could equally be applied to the radiation case at low levels. It is this assumption in particular that leads Ferguson to take a much more optimistic view about the effects of fossil fuel burning in power stations than that which has appeared in several US studies, such as those by Comar and Sagan, Inhaber, and the American Medical Association. Apart from this one factor, these studies and the others reviewed by Ferguson are in general agreement.

This useful report once again demonstrates the fact that the risks associated with all facets of electricity production, from mining to fuel use and subsequent waste treatment, are at levels which have found general public acceptance. If anything, conditions have progressively improved over the years, particularly with the reduction of pneumoconiosis in the mining industry. The biggest single factor of all risks (if public health effects of fossil fuel burning are ignored) is deaths in the coal mining industry. The nuclear industry is once again shown to compare favourably with the alternatives considered.

The bulk of this book evolved from lectures given by the authors to students at the Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi. It has three distinct sections. The first, comprising some 220 pages, provides an interesting introduction to the theory of lasers. The presentation is in places surprisingly mathematical, although a full quantum–mechanical theory is beyond the scope of the book. A few laser systems are discussed (e.g. ruby, helium–neon, CW carbon dioxide, dye and semi–conductor lasers) to flesh out these fundamentals. There are one or two surprising omissions : for example, the chapter on optical resonators does not treat waveguide lasers nor the so–called unstable resonators which are of such utility in large (high Fresnel number) systems, and excimer lasers are omitted. The next section of approximately 90 pages surveys a wide range of laser applications, in a manner which challenges the student to read more widely. For research workers its treatment (which covers holography, laser fusion, optical communications, laser chemistry and isotope separation, metrology, laser machining, lasers in medicine and so on) must inevitably appear superficial. The final section of the book, by way of compensation, will not date — for here we read the Nobel lectures of Townes, Prokorov, Basov and Gabor.

In summary, this is a carefully produced volume which should prove popular with undergraduate students interested in an introduction to the history and theory of lasers. Those interested specifically in laser applications should read elsewhere.

Number 309, July

I would not normally wish to comment on a review of a publication for which I was at any rate partly responsible, but Dr Jones’ three pages in ATOM 306, April 1982 on ‘Nuclear Energy : the Real Costs’¹ is not so much a review as an attempted refutation. He himself says at the end of his ‘review’ that he has sought to point out that Sir Kelvin Spencer’s committee have presented an incomplete and misleading analysis which, regrettably, is of little value to anyone wishing to have a better understanding of the nuclear costs question, and that sufficient has been said (by Dr Jones) to show that these (calculations) cannot be regarded as reliable and the conclusions based on them therefore fall.

Since most of the calculations criticised by Dr Jones derive from my paper in Energy Policy² (the draft of which was familiar to him, although it had not been published when he wrote the ‘review’) I hope you will allow me to comment on some of the points he makes.

Everyone would agree that the future demand for electricity is a major factor in any decision on the future of nuclear power. As a factor to be considered I would put it second only to the dangerous character of nuclear technology (both intrinsically and as leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons)^NOTE. However, the CSENE Report¹ was primarily concerned with the economics of nuclear power in the period up to the end of the century, and the conclusion 11.5 — that electricity conservation should reduce by at least a factor of two the electricity generating requirements in this country is consistent with a doubling of the actual end–use of electricity for its essential purposes. The possibilities are exemplified month after month in Energy Manager. An example from the April 1982 issue is NEI Parsons Heaton works in Newcastle. New lighting and controls are estimated to have reduced the lighting consumption on a yearly basis from 473 000 kWh to 118 400 kWh — a saving of 75 per cent with an increase in illuminance of from 100–300 per cent. The efficiency of electric motors is admitted to be very poor in general and will allow improvements of the order of 50 per cent. As the wasteful use of electrical resistance heating is phased out, the capacity will be available for new uses.

It is not necessary to postulate a halving of electricity production (even with a doubling of end–use consumption). The lower end of the CEGB’s latest forecasts is sufficient to sustain the CSENE analysis. Since these CEGB forecasts have been coming down rapidly and steadily for at least the last five years (see my article in The Ecologist³) and show no sign of slowing up, let alone levelling off, the lower bound this year is likely to be the upper bound next.

Dr Jones agrees with the results of our calculations on inflation corrected capital costs with 5 per cent interest rate, which show Magnox electricity dearer than coal^NOTE, but claims that the result says nothing about whether investment in coal as opposed to Magnox would have proved cheaper, it offers no guidance on future investment and it says nothing about national resource costs. This sweeping judgment makes nonsense of the CEGB’s evidence to the Select Committee on Energy (Report on the New Nuclear Power Programme — Vol II, p56) where the economics of nuclear power were based on an NEC calculation which produced figures for future stations at constant prices and 5 per cent interest rate, in exactly the same way as we have done for past stations. It is difficult to see how our calculations can be without significance unless the CEGB’s calculations are also useless as a guide to future investment.

Providing the assumptions are clearly stated (and compression in the CSENE Report may make it necessary to refer to the Energy Policy paper²) the method is valid within its limits equally for past and future calculations.

Dr Jones complains that the figures for the NEC turnround from -£25/kWpa to +£31/kWpa require coal costs to remain constant, not just to 1986/7 but for the whole lifetime of the station. True, but he knows that this was just an illustrative example, which kept the far more unreasonable nuclear costs the same as for the CEGB’s calculation. When a realistic NEC calculation was attempted (Figure 5 in the paper²) the -£25/kWpa produced by CEGB’s assumptions turned round to +£88/kWpa, although this case did include a 2 per cent pa increase in coal costs from 1986/7 to the end of the century.

This trivial example of the errors and misconceptions in the CSENE Report’s set of assumptions alternative to those of the CEGB is given full treatment, while the main alternative is not mentioned. The most significant CEGB assumption was that coal costs would increase in real terms by 36 per cent between 1980 and 1986/7, and it made this assumption at the same time as the understanding with the NCB was entered into which, in present circumstances, practically guarantees that there would be zero real increase in coal prices for the next five years. I believe Dr Jones does not dispute that a large increase in coal prices over the construction period (or an even larger increase following commissioning — see Figure 3 of my paper²) is required, in order that the NEC calculation should produce a clear negative result which would enable the CEGB to claim that building a nuclear power station is economic on energy cost savings alone. As things are, that claim clearly fails, and I would have expected Dr Jones to acknowledge this fact, rather than quibble about an illustrative result which is fully explained in the paper from which it was taken.

I am equally puzzled by Dr Jones’ criticism of my nuclear fuel costs. No one knows better than I do that there is considerable uncertainty about my fuel cost figures, due to lack of specific information. I have been trying for the past year to get information which would enable me to refine the calculations. BNFL refer me to CEGB who originally took a collective decision (May 1981) not to answer your detailed numerical questions at this stage, but have recently promised to reply to my latest request for information. I am doubtful as to whether the answer will be other than ‘elliptical’ but one can only wait and hope!

I tried Dr Jones in March 1981, but he replied, in relation to nuclear fuel costs, I have no access to the details of current CEGB commercial arrangements, nor do I see a need for such access. How he can know what CEGB is paying for uranium ore or separative work unless he has since acquired the information he saw no need for in March 1981, I am unable to understand. If he has acquired the information I wish he would let me have it.

CEGB is certainly not in the market (if the expression has any meaning in the nuclear context), but has long term contracts for both uranium ore and separative work. For uranium the Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report (MMC p.173, 7.58) says that purchase is by means of long term contracts of between five and ten years’ duration, negotiated many years in advance. The details of the long term contracts were censored from the Report. However, uranium costs are a small part of fuel costs, and large variations in price have little effect (see my paper², p.92, Note 39).

The separative work is more important. Until 1978 the CEGB obtained enriched material from the UKAEA’s diffusion plant at Capenhurst… The Board has told us that it proposes to discontinue the use of this facility as soon as possible in view of its high production costs and the Board’s present levels (MMC p. 175, 7.75). Two contracts have been placed (with URENCO) for 5 950 tonnes separative work for the period 1980–1994 (MMC p.177, 7.77). CEGB has negotiated a contract for 1 000 tonnes separative enrichment work in the USSR over the period 1980–90 (MMC p.177, 7.79–7.82) from which it appears that the 1981 URENCO price was more than 5 per cent above that of the US enrichment plants and rising relative to them. However, it is expected that the US diffusion price (which is effectively the world market price) will rise faster than the URENCO centrifuge price in the long run. If the US price gets very substantially above the URENCO price (which is escalated on the basis of defined indices which can be checked against external information) URENCO can review its prices upwards.

CEGB’s policy is to hold eight months’ supply of enriched material. It estimates that on 31 March 1982 it will hold £70m of stock, equivalent to two years’ supply. It is attempting to reschedule deliveries from both URENCO and the USSR (MMC p.178, 7.83).

I presume that Dr Jones has been working on the US enrichment prices, and when he sends me his figures and calculation, as I have sent him mine, I will see whether they justify altering my results. In view of the above quotations I do not think this is likely, and we shall have to depend on CEGB producing some figures of actual costs before it is worth making any changes.

In coal fuel costs, I have given some of the arguments in my paper² (p.78, Note 7) and expanded on them (especially in relation to coal subsidies and the effect on coal prices of building unnecessary and expensive nuclear stations) in the article in The Ecologist³.

On French claims, the CSENE Report was referring to unofficial but well–informed sources. French official figures are completely uncheckable and completely undeserving of credence. Even the British Government is apparently not clear exactly how much subsidy is involved in bolstering French nuclear power ; but Mr Howell at the Select Committee on Energy hearing on pricing policy (28.1.81, 9.83) agreed that a £1·4 billion capital write–off and interest charges suspended until 1985, or broadly similar things had been done in France. But he still trusted, as Dr Jones apparently does, their projections from an undisclosed base for future costs.

Finally, on the question of construction overruns, our modest 30 per cent is said to be really over 50 per cent, because CEGB includes 17·5 per cent allowance in its estimates. There are two things to be said on this. First, the actual tender prices for Drax B and Heysham II were 9 per cent and 25 per cent respectively above the estimated costs of the previous year (MMC p.80, 5.60). So the 17·5 per cent allowance is likely to be taken up before construction starts. Secondly, the 17·5 per cent is only on construction costs (and is an acknowledged underestimate — MMC p.83, 5.67) whereas our 30 per cent was on construction costs plus interest during construction (IDC). Any time overrun has a large effect on IDC. Perhaps the cost overrun figures for the nuclear stations under construction will put this estimated future cost overrun of 30–50 per cent into perspective. With constant prices and interest at 5 per cent, the total cost overruns (construction + IDC) are as follows : Dungeness B — 230 per cent ; Hartlepool — 201 per cent ; Heysham I — 85 per cent. These are based on figures for March 1980 when it was estimated that the first reactor in each case would be completed in June 1981, March 1982 and December 1981 respectively (MMC p.335, Appendix 25). The estimates then were said to be under review and the overruns have obviously increased.

I hope that those who have been put off by Dr Jones’ review will now think it worth while to study the three documents cited above.

References

1. A Special Report by the Commission for the Study of the Economics of Nuclear Electricity (CSENE), Worthywale Manor, Camelford, Cornwall.
2. The Real Cost of Nuclear Electricity in the UK, J.W. Jeffery, Energy Policy, 10, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 76–100.
3. The Nuclear Economic Fraud, J.W, Jeffery, The Ecologist, Vol. 12, No. 2, March/April 1982, pp. 80–86.

Dr Jones replies :

Professor Jeffery, who acted as a consultant to Sir Kelvin Spencer’s CSENE, has spent a great deal of time and effort in trying to understand and interpret the published material on nuclear and fossil fuelled electricity generation costs. The results of his work have appeared in the paper to which he refers, and a comment on this from the CEGB is expected to appear in the September issue of Energy Policy.

The Statement of Case for the Sizewell B Inquiry, published on 12 May, provides the latest costings based on detailed analysis, and once again demonstrates the sizable economic advantage that nuclear energy offers (see the accompanying Table), against a wide range of alternative views of the economic and energy future. On one such scenario construction of Sizewell B will save some £500 million to £1 000 million in 1982 money over its lifetime.

In the light of the availability of this later document, detailed comment on Professor Jeffery’s paper would be superfluous. He and I have very different views on the attractiveness of electricity, on feasible conservation levels, on the likely behaviour of coal prices in the absence of nuclear competition ; as well as on the distinction between sweeping judgment and fact and on what constitutes just an illustrative example as opposed to a central conclusion (CSENE, summary point 8, page 5). However, I can agree with Professor Jeffery on the value of looking at all considered arguments.

Number 311, September

Three seeming disparate titles ; I group them here because their authors are equally concerned to review arguments and to urge reasoned conclusions.

Addinall and Ellington are senior lecturers at Robert Gordon’s Institute of Technology, Aberdeen, and their experience as teachers shows. They have an evident distaste for the disputations of highly polarized pro– and anti–factions… each almost incapable of listening to, let along appreciating, the other’s point of view, though they are themselves persuaded that the lives of their children will almost certainly be cleaner, healthier and more prosperous as a result of nuclear power.

This book is in four parts. In the first the authors discuss factually the nature of nuclear power ; in the second, why it is needed as a component of energy supply. Here, they acknowledge that the only safe conclusion that can be drawn from any technological forecast is that the further it looks ahead the more likely it is that it will be wrong, but they conclude that in Britain and the US (the only two countries whose energy future they examine in detail) significant amounts of nuclear power will be needed in coming decades. In part three the authors argue that a mixed thermal and fast reactor programme could sustain the industrialised nations of the western world at least until the potential of fusion has been evaluated thoroughly or the various alternative technologies have proved themselves to be practicable substitutes for present sources of energy.

In the fourth part of the book the authors discuss social and environmental considerations. They set out to look at both sides of the argument and conclude that on the basis of the available evidence we ourselves are fairly satisfied that, provided the agreed regulations and procedures are rigidly adhered to (their italics), nuclear workers are not put at special risk ; we are satisfied there is no real cause for public concern with respect to hazards presented to the general public ; and on the vexed questions of civil liberties and the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation they conclude first that there is no case for the industry to answer, and secondly that provided the spread of nuclear power is subject to responsible international control the risks of proliferation could be kept to a minimum.

To my mind, this fourth part of the book — essential if it was to reach any perspective — could have been longer ; at the expense if need be of the earlier parts. There is a useful, if brief, bibliography, and the book as a whole will serve as a good introduction for the layman.

Needs and resources

Peter Hodgson’s pamphlet aims to be no more than a snapshot of the world energy scene concluding with a discussion of the Christian response. He is head of the Nuclear Physics Theoretical Group of the Nuclear Physics Laboratory, Oxford, and is working on another book dealing with the energy crisis with special reference to nuclear energy ; this pamphlet might therefore be taken in part as a potted version of the longer work. He argues from considerations of resource limitation, concluding that sooner or later the world will experience a severe energy crisis, and this will increase the danger of nuclear war ; resources of both coal and uranium are enough to last for hundreds of years ; we cannot hope for a risk–free power source, so our increased power needs must come from a combination of these two, coupled perhaps with conservation. The concluding discussion of the Christian response amounts to a plea for responsible stewardship : familiar, nevertheless compelling.

Proliferation

Hodgson reminds us that an axe can be used to cut down a tree or to split a skull. David Fischer, formerly Assistant Director General for External Relations at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, addresses directly the overwhelming need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The book derives from two seminars he gave at the Australian National University in April last year, updated to take account of some recent developments — notably, the bombing of the Iraqi research center at Tuwaitha in June 1981.

Fischer suggests that attempts to restrain the spread of sensitive technologies cannot succeed in the long run : the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) and IAEA safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials probably represent the most that can be done at the present time by international safeguards systems to deter the spread of nuclear weapons, though the universal application of ‘full–scope’ (comprehensive) safeguards should remain the chief objective.

He argues that the fact that a particular country has accepted NPT and full–scope safeguards should not automatically suspend political assessment of the wisdom of exporting certain types of nuclear plant or technology, regardless of the politics of the region and the circumstances of the country. Self–imposed or mutually agreed restrain in relation to exports to politically volatile regions is still a valid, though limited, option ; it could not be effective for more than a couple of decades, but it might give time to find solutions to the underlying political or security problems which provide the incentive to get hold of nuclear weapons, or of the means to make them.

It is a pity that this book has been produced only in a limited edition. Although Fischer writes solely as an individual (without committing the IAEA) he is a thoroughly well–informed commentator ; and his logic is impeccable. If proliferation feeds upon itself, he says, the converse is also true ; a non–nuclear–weapon state that ratifies the NPT is obviously contributing to the confidence of its neighbours or potential adversaries and reducing, in turn, their incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. That said,

“it has become almost impossible to believe that we shall ever again have a world free of nuclear weapons, that we shall return to a state of innocence. … As Goldschmidt has said, as long as there are sovereign states able to go to war with one another no system can effectively prevent them from using for military purposes the resources of science and technology, nuclear and non–nuclear, if they believe that their existence or liberty depends on such use. History suggests that H.G. Wells may be nearer the mark than the fine biblical words on the walls of the United Nations Plaza about beating swords into ploughshares and making war no more. When he heard of Hiroshima, Wells is reported to have said : ‘At last, the idiot child has got hold of the box of matches’.”

Chilling words ; but they reinforce Fischer’s thesis that international cooperation is today essential.

Number 314, December

This is a remarkable book. First, it is very cheap (although would–be users outside North America may find it hard to lay their hands on it). Secondly, it has been produced — albeit with generously acknowledged assistance from people within the US Department of Energy and its contractors — by Samuel Glasstone.

My review could end there, but for those who are not yet familiar with this man’s incredible output I will add some words of explanation. The latest edition of his standard Nuclear Reactor Engineering (produced with Alexander Sesonske) makes the point in the Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data on the reverse of the title page : Glasstone, Samuel, 1897–… Most men would now, after some 38 books on various scientific subjects, be unplugging their typewriters. Not Glasstone. Here he is, instead, embarking on an ouvre whose stated purpose is to serve as a convenient reference to definitions of energy–related terms and descriptions of current and potential energy sources and their utilisation. The material is presented at a low technical level with emphasis on general principles, which are not difficult to understand, rather than technology.

There is no index : the purpose is served by an expanded contents listing in alphabetical order. The entires, too, are presented alphabetically with abundant cross–referencing. It would be petty to look for inconsistencies* or errors ; rather, I am content to report that this is a book for reference, and for browsing in during quiet moments. The flavour is North American ; the utility of the book is indisputable.

* As an editor, I have long been attracted by Emerson’s dictum : A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds… With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do.

The Health and Safety Executive has published a detailed paper on the role and work of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate in relation to the safety of nuclear power stations — particularly the pressurised water reactor.

The paper has been written to give further assistance to the public inquiry into the CEGB’s application to build a PWR adjacent to the existing Magnox station at Sizewell, Suffolk. The main inquiry hearings begin next month.

Announcing the new publication, the HSE recalled that in mid–July the NII published a review of the CEGB’s Pre–Construction Safety Report (PCSR) for the proposed PWR station. Should planning consent be granted following completion of the inquiry, the Board would still require a license from the HSE under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 to install and operate the station. This, the HSE said, would not be granted until the NII was satisfied with the safety case put forward.

The paper says the duty of the Inspectorate in relation to all nuclear power stations under the Act is to see that the appropriate standards are developed, achieved and maintained by the licensee, to see that necessary safety precautions are taken, and to monitor and regulate the safety of the plant by means of its powers under the licence granted.

This duty is carried out by assessment of the safety of proposed sites and nuclear plant designs, by the establishment of safety requirements for both operators and members of the public, and by inspection for compliance with these requirements at all stages from construction to operation and eventual decommissioning, the booklet says.

The system for ensuring nuclear safety provided by the relevant Acts in the UK is one which places the responsibility for safety squarely on the operator or licensee, requiring them to formulate the design safety criteria and standards, construction, commissioning and operating arrangements and procedures which will be used.

The paper descibes the NII’s safety philosophy and assessment work, licensing, siting, the Inspectorate’s earlier generic review of the PWR, regulatory control of the construction and commissioning of the plant and its operation and decommissioning. There are three appendices, one comprising a typical set of conditions attached to a nuclear power station licence.

Man and Atom Notes

• This would, of course, be effective, but it seems like a very odd strategy. The resultant economic contraction, aside from being generally undesirable, would almost certainly have a much more negative effect on the the financial positions of the fuel industries than would larger borrowings.
• The parentheses and commas in the original appear to have gotten out of place somehow. They have been moved to what appear to be the correct positions.
• More recent work has suggested a significant incidence of occupational disease among oil workers, in both extraction and refining/transport, due in particular to toxic and carcinogenic benzene and other aromatic hydrocarbons.
• Is nuclear energy intrinsically dangerous? We suppose it must be, in common with any energy source of sufficient magnitude and concentration to be of industrial value. Looking at events such as the Vajont dam collapse, however, it seems entirely plausible that the intrinsic dangers of nuclear energy are smaller, per unit of energy, than for other sources. And while the technology of nuclear power may, in principle, make it easier to build nuclear weapons, we know of no country, from the USA to North Korea, which has been impeded in its pursuit of the latter by not possessing the former.
• Professor Jeffrey conveniently forgets the coal strikes which followed hot on the heels of the oil shock of 1973. Without the Magnox stations, the situation would have been far more dire. What cost dependable supply?
  He also seems to forget that the initial Magnox stations were necessarily developmental, and do not represent the kind of results which would be obtained by stations designed on the basis of experience for maximum economy. In fact, however, the increase of fuel burn–up from the initial 3 megawatt–days of heat per kilogram to 5·5, and the extension of reactor life from the planned 20 or 25 years to 40 in several cases, made them ultimately quite economical.