This book is very like the curate’s egg ; parts of it seem to be good but other parts are certainly bad and the overall effect is therefore that it is distasteful, indeed harmful, rather than nourishing.
Exactly half the book is concerned with Hiroshima and the advent of the Atomic Age
including the subsequent build–up of nuclear weapons, primarily by the super powers (though Garrison tells us later that more and more countries are developing nuclear weapons from plutonium waste generated by their civil nuclear operations
).
This long first chapter includes a well researched brief account of the events leading up to the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the effect of that on the survivors and the events of the years that followed.
(Indeed, this half of the book has nearly three times as many references as the latter half where most of the references are to secondary sources.)
The author applies the demonstrable psychic numbing
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to those living in the shadow of today’s nuclear weapons stockpile, and goes on to suggest that in both categories this can lead to paranoia although in some cases there may be a psychic opening up
and the development of a sense of mission.
Later, he seeks to apply this thesis also to nuclear reactors, arguing that society’s response both to nuclear weapons and to nuclear reactors should be one of non–violence as a means of transforming society by non–cooperation
with those aspects of society which he condemns.
No–one is likely to dispute the view that greater good could be done if the money spent all round the world on arms were used to help to reduce poverty and starvation in those parts of the world with the lowest standard of living. But I would dispute some of the facts and descriptions given, some of the analysis of the psychological implications of the development, use, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and some of the conclusions. Incidentally, the author builds on a theory of evolution put forward by sociobiologists based on the aggression of man which has been challenged by more recent students of anthropology.
The second half of the book, however, is so packed with wrong or incomplete facts, misleading inferences and selected statistics given out of context (which may frighten by their sheer size but are meaningless without explanation) that the entire argument and its conclusion that the nuclear fuel cycle in its normal operation is killing people by the thousands with leukemia and cancer
is completely without foundation.
In fact, it is totally incorrect.
Copious quotations from, for example, Jungk’s Nuclear State (previously reviewed by Brookes for ATOM, No. 271, May 1979) merely repeat statements that have frequently been demonstrated to be false.
The remarks on radiation damage report studies by Gofman, Mancuso, Sternglass and others but ignore their rejection by the world radiobiological community (e.g. the Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionising Radiation of the US National Academy of Sciences — on their latest report, see ATOM No. 288, October 1980).
Garrison says plutonium… tends to concentrate itself in the organic life in the environment and in the food chain
.
This is the direct reverse of what actually happens since most of any plutonium in the soil remains there and does not get incorporated into the food chain in anything like as high a concentration as that in the soil in which the food is grown.
Later, he says that all nuclear reactors and indeed all nuclear facilities of any type were built on the basis of the threshold theory, i.e. that there is a threshold level of radiation dose below which there is no danger at all of damage, and also that Government regulations on permissible levels of radiation are based on this theory ; this is simply not true.
Furthermore, it would only be the most perceptive reader who could discover, if he did not already know, that there is a significant level of background radiation to which we are all subject and Garrison makes no attempt to relate the levels of radioactivity that he discusses to that background radiation.
Nor does he attempt to compare the health risks to workers in the industry or the general public from nuclear energy with those we run from the other sources of energy on which we now or might in future need to rely.
The book aims to demonstrate an inevitable link between the use of nuclear energy for civil purposes and the production of weapons of mass destruction (integral to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the presence and proliferation of nuclear reactors
), and to do this the author clothes the use of nuclear reactors for electricity generation in a fabric of fear.
When the author’s errors are corrected this part of his analysis collapses.
No–one denies that misused a nuclear power programme could be a means of obtaining nuclear material for weapons purposes (though by no means the easiest one) ; assurances agains the non–proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be secured by abandoning nuclear power — it requires a political solution and the same attitude of mind which the author advocates in his opening chapter.
The book is published by SCM Press Ltd.
Although the SCM Press are a recognised publisher of religious books, their publications have included some with which many of the churches profoundly disagree and there is therefore perhaps little danger that the thesis of this book as a whole will be regarded as having the backing of the churches or other organised religious bodies.
But its origin and its closing section on the way to non–violence
require us to look at the moral issue it raises.
To me, three stand out :
soft energy pathset out by Amory Lovins is sufficient but few are yet convinced of that and the consequence of its failure, if we commit ourselves completely to it, would be violent indeed. There is no need if we approach God’s creation with reverence to regard current technology as inevitably
dehumanising, and all the risks and benefits of the various ways in which energy can be provided, including the risk of inadequate energy which Garrison himself points out can lead to insecurity and threat of war, need to be fairly assessed.
The curate tried to eat his egg ; sad to say I have found this one too indigestible as recommended reading for others.
A comprehensive guide to nuclear power produced by Students Against Nuclear Energy
The authors of anti–nuclear publications would be highly gratified if they knew how thoroughly those of us in the industry read their works and of the serious consideration given to any new points they raise. A responsible and responsive industry can do no less.
At first sight the booklets discussed in this critique appear very different. The Ecoropa work adopts the format of the earlier pamphlet from the same source which posed its own questions and provided its own answers. The earlier text has been printed in full with AEA comments in Nuclear Power — The Real Facts1. The student publication has the format of a popular magazine and is illustrated with selected photographs and cartoons.
The contents and style of the two works are not dissimilar however. Both use the same stock set of arguments and themes. Both make considerable use of the same, and by now familiar, technique of selective quotation. Both resort to presentation of material that has been strongly criticized without reference to that criticism. Both use the open–ended style of argument that invites the less informed reader to form a conclusion that is not logically justified.
Since the questions and themes are somewhat repetitive (and in some cases internally contradictory) it would be tedious to attempt a point by point commentary. For this reason I have grouped the main themes and paraphrased the arguments used in the publications and add generalised comment, resorting to the specific where the claims presented in the works are particularly misleading. Specific questions in the Ecoropa booklet are identified by Q numbers and relevant sections of the Student publication by page (P) numbers.
The authors (Q1, Q3, Q4) point to the early high expectations for nuclear power and criticise past official forecasts of energy and electricity demand and the methods by which they are made.
In the early days of nuclear power there were indeed some who saw it as a vast source of low cost energy that had the potential to release man from constraints that might otherwise hold back his progress. The industrial world saw many technologies in a similar euphoric light — space travel, ocean exploitation, lasers, etc. The large potential for nuclear power is still there and whilst not free it can still be a cheap option compared with the alternatives.
Forecasting has always been a hazardous pursuit and this has never been more true than at the present time when there is no general agreement about the future of the world economy.
The clsoe linkage that exists between industrial output and energy consumption, even given major conservation efforts, is such that if one is prepared to accept economic stagnation with its implications for employment, or if one believes this to be inevitable, then one can predict
low energy requirements.
Most people aspire to a better future and governments seek to meet those aspirations.
To plan for a near zero growth in energy supply capability, as some would have us do2, is to opt needlessly for an nergy constrained future, and could lead to deferment of necessary action and investment in an industry with long lead times3.
What one has to ask is whether indefinite extrapolation of currently prevailing economic pessimism may not prove to be as misplaced in the long term as the extrapolation of the optimism of the 1960s now seems to be.
The immediate energy problem is correctly identified (Q2, Q5, P27) as being one of reducing demand for oil and to a lesser extent gas, both of which are accepted to be rapidly depleting resources. It is argued by Bunyard and Morgan–Grenville that nuclear reactors can only produce electricity (Q5) and that their role is therefore limited. The heat producing capability of nuclear sources is recognised by the other authors although only as an afterthought (P28).
The Government programme announced in December 1979 for 15 GW of nuclear capacity to be ordered in the decade 1982–1992 would lead to a total of 22 GW installed capacity in 2000 after allowing for retirement of Magnox stations. Given reasonable economic growth and growth of electricity demand, the installed capacity would be higher.
In 1979 nuclear stations generated 34·6 terawatt–hours of electricity which by 2000 (on the above conservative programme) could reach 125 TWh. This would require about 50 million tonnes of coal or about 30 million tonnes of oil if it were to be produced from these fossil sources. On a world scale nuclear power will greatly reduce the demand for fossil fuels and release these for uses where they are the only or the most appropriate fuels. By 2020 the World Energy Conference figures4 suggest that oil and gas, coal and nuclear could be contributing roughly equally to the world’s primary energy needs.
We can agree with the authors that the time to reduce dependence on oil is short. We can agree that the renewable sources need to be developed and exploited vigorously wherever this is economically sensible and environmentally acceptable. However, to reject a major and assured source of energy (be it nuclear, coal or anything else) would truly make us ‘idiots before the world’. (Q2)
The expansion of electricity use is not counter–productive as Ecoropa suggests (Q5). In the first place it is the only energy source suitable for providing power for motors, lighting, etc. in the home and many industrial applications. Secondly, even in heating applications it is clean, available and delivers energy with high efficiency at the point of use and employs low capital cost equipment. For these reasons it commands a premium. In practice the conversion losses at power stations are largely offset by the inefficiency at the point of use of fossil heating systems (P28). In the future the efficiency of the latter will improve but the highly insulated home or office will also have lower overall energy requirements which will tend to favour the lower capital cost, i.e. electrical, systems.
If electrical costs fall in relation to fossil fuel costs, as is generally expected in the long term, the highly efficient coupling possible in electrical systems will make them the preferred choice for many industrial heating and drying processes5.
Thus electricity has its own expanding uses. In the longer term the possibility of direct use of waste heat from power stations (nuclear or fossil) or through district heating systems could also be expected to increase the nuclear share of total primary energy consumption (P29).
It is argued there there is over–capacity
in the UK generating system which invalidates the Government’s nuclear programme (Q5, P27).
There is a widespread misunderstanding of this. The CEGB do not have over–capacity of modern efficient plant ; indeed during the spring of 1979 the available capacity was only marginally greater than demand. Some reserve capacity is needed to cover exceptional weather conditions, outages due to maintenance, and general demand growth. CEGB analysis sets the desired planning margin on the basis of their experience and the reliability demanded of the grid at 28 per cent ; to have less owuld seriously increase the risk of power cuts in the winter months. Should excess capacity occur in the short term, savings will have been achieved by building more efficient modern plant and closing or mothballing older plant. This is shown by the negative net effective cost for new nuclear plant in recent CEGB Annual Report9.
Professor Rotblat’s article in The Guardian6 is quoted by Ecoropa (page 10) to throw doubt on the scale of the future nuclear contribution to global energy supplies. Further comments appear in relation to the role of the fast reactor (Q29).
The points made in the Guardian article were refuted in subsequent correspondence by Dr Walter Marshall7 and the author8, 31. The nuclear industry has never claimed that nuclear power is a panacea for all our future energy problems. Nevertheless the world’s known resources of low cost (less than $50/lb U3O8) uranium, which are properly–listed in the student pamphlet (P10) at 5 million tonnes, are sufficient to provide fuel for 2 500 GWe of PWRs for their lifetime (taken as 20 years) and an equivalent number of fast reactors for some 2 000 years. Given fast reactors, these known low cost resources alone can provide energy equivalent to the current total world consumption rate for over 500 years. This is scarcely negligible.
These comments are independent of the breeding gain of the fast reactor and would be true even if it were zero. However, breeding gain, among other things, will affect the rate at which fast reactors can be deployed and hence the maximum number that could be in place in future years.
As pointed out earlier, the contribution of nuclear sources to world primary energy needs in 2020 could be equivalent to that of coal or oil and gas. This is certainly not negligible as implied by Professor Rotblat. All three sources and the renewables (notably hydropower and fuelwood) are essential if we are to avoid the risk of a major energy crisis. Omission of any one source would inhibit the systematic substitution for depleting fossil resources.
The Ecoropa authors point to the increases in capital costs of nuclear plants, particularly as presented in US studies (Q7) and the movements of electrical generation costs over time (Q8). They are critical of CEGB presentation of relative costs and having answered the question themselves in the affirmative (Q8, page 13) illogically query (Q9) whether CEGB published costs fully reflect the costs of reprocessing, waste disposal, etc. Similar points are raised in the student publication (P27). Further comments on costs appear in relation to PWR (Q28) and fast reactors (Q29, page 37).
This is, of course, well trodden ground. It is generally accepted worldwide that nuclear power is significantly cheaper than coal and much cheaper than oil for base–load electricity generation except in places where very cheap fossil fuels are available (e.g. in some US states and the east coast of Australia). This was not true when the first Magnox reactors were launched but escalating fossil fuel prices have since had a major influence on the size of the benefits we now derive from them.
Capital cost escalation has hit both nuclear and fossil plant but many of the factors leading to escalation have been related to environmental regulations and are not ongoing. It is true (Q28) that costs of electricity produced from new nuclear or fossil stations will be greater in real terms than that from some existing stations. Nevertheless the most recent estimates of nuclear costs by the CEGB9 (and confirmed by our own studies) show that new nuclear stations for generation in the late 1980s can still be expected to produce considerably cheaper electricity than new coal or oil plants. These calculations assume some relative real increase in fossil fuel prices, but even if coal prices could be held at current levels in real terms nuclear stations should be competitive.
Peter Bunyard has conducted his own calculations on reprocessing and fast reactor electricity costs (Q29, page 37 and ref.16). As I have pointed out elsewhere17 these calculations are based on his own excessively high estimates of costs for reprocessing and fail to take account of the value of recycled uranium and consequently reduced waste management costs.
The series of rhetorical questions put at the end of Q8 are an example of the worst form of misinformation. Extensive studies of the risks attached to nuclear power generation have been undertaken and show that if anything it will cost fewer lives per gigawatt sent out than equivalent coal plant, and this incorporates uranium mining and major accident risks. It may even involve fewer deaths and injuries than equivalent output from renewable sources when all the risks associated with materials and construction are included, although the data on this are inconclusive as yet and require further study.
One might borrow the Ecoropa authors’ rhetorical style and ask them how they cost the risks of international or internal conflict arising from failure to meet energy needs and people’s aspirations? Or hypothermia from failure to provide energy at affordable prices? Or the extra lives that would be lost per GW of electricity if sources other than nuclear had to be used?
Both publications (Q10, P26) employ the same statistics to argue that an investment of £1 000 million in a nuclear power station would create only 500 full–time jobs — each job has cost £2 million
.
This is compared with costs of job creation in other industries and in conservation activities with reference to the CAITS report by David Elliot13.
The approach adopted by both groups is completely inconsistent and illogical.
It compares capital cost of plant per operator in the generating boards with the costs of creating jobs in the manufacturing and engineering industries.
The capital expenditure itself is a reflection of the jobs created in manufacturing industry, which both groups ignore.
On their basis, an insulation programme would have an infinite cost per job because once installed there is no operator
employment!
The selective qotation of the CAITS study ignores the detailed criticisms of that work by Professor Pearce of Aberdeen University14 and Brookes15.
Both publications stress the potentially damaging effects of radiation and make some play of the well–publicised studies and comments claiming that low level radiation effects have been under–estimated (Q11–Q19, P8, P9).
Their description of the effects of radiation is generally correct but they totally ignore the key fact that living systems are extremely resistant to radiation and that a radiation–induced cancer is a very rare phenomenon. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, 82 000 of the 285 000 bomb surivivors have been studied extensively for more than 30 years. Of those studied, 4 000 have since died of cancer. The number of cancer deaths that would have been expected in an un–irradiated population of the same size is about 3 800, therefore only about 200 of these cancer deaths can be ascribed to the radiation from the bombs, in spite of the large doses of radiation received. There is no evidence of enhanced cancer incidence associated with natural background levels of radiation or with the very much lower levels to which members of the public are exposed as a result of the activities of the nuclear industry.
On a more specific note, the claim by Ecoropa (Q16) that the CEGB does not incorporate radiation doses of contract workers in their statistics is false. CEGB maintains and publishes full records of doses received by all workers at their establishments, including both permanent and temporary staff.
The Ecoropa publication (Q21) attempts to create concern about safety and evacuation procedures by unqualified references to events overseas and to the use of nuclear weapons in war. They also provide a misleading picture of the position on compensation in the unlikely event that a major nuclear accident occured (Q22).
There have been instances of evacuation connected with nuclear incidents. The evidence would seem to confirm that a major evacuation did take place in the Urals, whilst at Three Mile Island, after some confusion, an evacuation was carried out for pregnant women and pre–school aged children within five miles of the plant, although the decision was taken on the mistaken interpretation of the release of a burst of radiation.
In the unlikely case of a serious accident at a UK nuclear power station, the station’s operator would be responsible for providing the police with advice and information on which a decision to evacuate could be taken. It is the responsibility of the police and local authorities concerned to provide appropriate warning to the public and to supervise and control any evacuation21. In the event of an incident at a nuclear installation overseas affecting the UK, it would be for the Secretary of State for the Environment, in consultation with the Minister of Agriculture, to assess the environmental effect and to advise the local authorities concerned who have standing arrangements for all incidents affecting their areas.
Arrangements have been agreed22 by which, in the case of an emergency at Cap de la Hague likely to affect the Channel Islands, the Prefect of La Manche would notify the islands direct. The French and British Governments are in the process of establishing general contingency arrangements covering the action to be taken in the event of a serious nuclear incident in either country.
Insurance arrangements were explained by the Government in 197823.
“Under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, operators of nuclear installations are liable to pay compensation for any injury or damage arising out of, or resulting from, the radioactive and other hazardous properties of any nuclear matter which may be involved in an occurrence on their sites or while in the course of carriage to or from their sites. Operators are required to provide financial security of £5 million against such claims. If the total claims for compensation, duly established, exceed £5 million, the Act provides for public funds to be available to ensure that such claims are satisfied up to a total of £50 million. The Act provides also that, if the total of such claims exceeds £50 million, they shall be satisfied to such extent, and out of funds provided by such needs, as Parliament may determine.”
These statutory provisions remove any need for personal insurance against nuclear hazards. Most domestic policies specifically exclude such risks on this account.
While the student magazine is content to quote the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (P9) the Ecoropa authors (Q18, Q19) question the independence and integrity of the regulatory and advisory bodies and the principles of weighing benefits from investment in safety measures against the benefits to be derived.
Ecoropa’s attack on the integrity and independence of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and the ICRP is totally unwarranted and without foundation. NII is responsible to Parliament through the Health and Safety Executive and the Secretary of State for the Environment. It is entirely independent of the nuclear industry. The existence of ICRP does not depend on the nuclear industry — indeed, it was established in 1928 well before nuclear fission was even discovered. It is concerned with all sources of ionising radiation.
As knowledge of the effects of radiation on man increase, largely as a result of the unprecedented level of expenditure on the subject compared with expenditure on other harmful environmental agents, radiological protection practice is continually being refined and improved.
Once a given level of safety has been achieved, further safety can generally be bought, but only at an ever–increasing cost. In the UK, there has not been a single reactor accident leading to known harm to any member of the public in over 20 years of nuclear electricity generation and health and safety standards of the work–force are acknowledged to be outstandingly high even by anti–nuclear spokesmen. Safety levels are thus clearly already very high. It has been estimated that the cost of each additional life saved as a result of increased nuclear safety standards in the USA over the past 12 years has been $188 million18. If one consideres safety in the community as a whole, such expenditure is clearly far in excess of an optimum where the cost of saving extra lives in the nuclear field would be equal to the cost of saving lives in other activities of the community.
A great deal is made (Q20–Q22) of past nuclear incidents in which releases of radiation, and in some cases deaths, have occurred.
Stress is laid on the numbers of accidents
, citing unofficial German sources, and the Kyshtym puzzle which has been the subject of publications by Medvedev.
It is of course true that accidents have occurred in experimental reactors and other nuclear plant and that these have resulted in some releases of radiation and some deaths.
In planning nuclear facilities, the designer has to provide safety systems and barriers that, for the full range of possible fault sequences, will limit and control the release of radioactivity to small and acceptable quantities. This attention to detail in the design, inspection and maintenance of nuclear power plants, together with a very high standard of operator training, ensures an exceptionally high level of reliability and safety of operation. Indeed the nuclear industry is a leader in the field of reliability and its techniques are now so well developed and acceptable that they are being widely applied in many other areas, especially in the field of potentially dangerous non–nuclear plant.
Risk can never be completely eliminated but as the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution have said,
“Given the emphasis on safety in the nuclear field, the measured and cautious approach to development and the extent of precautions taken in design to limit the consequences of possible failure mechanisms, we do not doubt that the risk of serious accident in any single reactor is extremely small.”19
If such a highly unlikely major reactor accident were to occur its effects would be far from infinite as suggested by Ecoropa (Q27, page 33). Examples of incidents included in their own document (e.g. Kyshtym, Windscale and Three Mile Island) have in fact indicated the finiteness of accidents. They are not out of line with naturally occurring events ; as a recent report by Batelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories shows20 ash from the Mount St. Helens volcano released far more radioactivity on eruption than did the Three Mile Island accident.
Major very low probability accidents are of less significance than the effects of lower level higher probability events such as can be expected in normal operation. Many studies, such as those mentioned above10, 11, 12 have considered the number of deaths resulting from various ways of generating electricity. They conclude that all methods of generation are associated with low levels of risk and that of the major methods used in the UK, coal, oil and nuclear, the safest is nuclear. Ecoropa (Q16) stresses the hazards to uranium miners. These are well known and over the past decade improved ventilation in uranium mines has led to considerable reductions in the radiation doses received. Comparable improvements have also, of course, been made in coal mining where annual accidental death rates in the UK have fallen from many hundreds to about 50 and pneumoconiosis incidence has also been reduced. For the production of a given amount of electrical power the injury rates (fatal and non–fatal) from all causes are considerably lower for uranium miners than for coal miners because far fewer uranium miners are needed to provide the fuel to produce the same electrical output.
The UKAEA and BNFL have settled a total of four claims for industrial compensation where death was alleged to have been caused by radiation at work. A number of cases are pending or have not yet been settled. These cases may be compared with nearly 3 000 deaths in the coal industry 1959–79 and with over 100 deaths on the oil rig Alexander Kjelland in March 1980. A survey is kept of the mortality rates of UKAEA and BNFL workers and pensioners and tables are published. If these statistics are compared with those for people doing the same type of work in other industries, they are seen to be remarkably similar.
Not unexpectedly, both works under review comment extensively on the Three Mile Island PWR incident and quote from the conclusions of the Kemeny Report (Q23, Q24, P6, P7). Quotations from other sources are used to present the risk and possible consequences of the accident for the local population.
Although the Three Mile Island incident has harmed no member of the public, it is a major financial catastrophe for the owners. The accident developed because of weaknesses in detailed design, safety analyses, and performance of some components and operator error. If the operators had kept the emergency core kooling systems on through the early stages of the accident it would have been limited to a relatively insignificant incident.
Some extreme claims have been made24, particularly by Dr E.J. Sternglass, concerning infant death rates due to TMI.
These claims have been refuted by the Pennsylvania Department of Health25 who say that after careful study of all available information we continue to find no evidence to date that radiation from the TMI nuclear power plant resulted in an increased number of fetal, neonatal or infant deaths
.
The US Secretary of Health gave an estimate of possible deaths from cancer due to the accident as one in the 2 000 000 population.
Even allowing for underestimation, this figure would still be small statistically compared with the natural incidence in the region of 300 000.
It is to be regretted that both publications have chosen to quote selectively.
The Kemeny Commission report itself concluded26 : Based on our investigation of the health effects of the accident, we conclude that in spite of serious damage to the plant, most of the radiation was contained and the actual release will have a negligible effect on the physical health of individuals.
Since other quotations were taken from this source it cannot have been unknown to the Ecoropa authors.
The Kemeny Report has been studied with the greatest care in the UK, particularly in relation to the Commission’s findings on plant instrumentation, operator training, emergency arrangements and communication. It is believed that there are no major deficiencies in UK practice but there is awareness of the crucial importance of continuing to exercise all possible care.
The two reports discuss reactor choice (Q24, Q28, P4, P7) and make the usual adverse comments on the history of the UK AGR programme and the intended construction of a PWR.
Following the TMI accident the safety of PWRs in general is questioned and capital made of the cracks
in French PWRs and some of the CEGB Magnox stations.
At the present time there are plans to build only one PWR in the UK at Sizewell in Suffolk. This will be based on a Westinghouse design which will take full account of the lessons of TMI. The designs will have to satisfy the NII and a full–scale public inquiry has been promised.
The earliest Magnox reactors have shown excellent reliability for almost a quarter of a century ; they are regularly inspected by the NII. Some Magnox reactors are currently out of service for investigation of faults found in certain components in the coolant circuits. The cracking found is believed to have been present from the time of construction, though only now detectable using modern techniques. It is being repaired by normal engineering processes and the reactors should return to service and continue to generate electricity for many more years.
In spite of regrettable delays in the commissioning of AGRs, they produce or, where not yet completed, are expected to produce electricity considerably cheaper than fossil–fuelled stations9.
Both publications refer to the possibility of core meltdown (P4, Q25, Q26), although Ecoropa recognise that thermal reactors cannot explode like atomic bombs.
The rapid melting of the core of a reactor and its penetration of the barriers beneath as is envisaged in The China Syndrome
could not occur in existing British commercial reactors.
The low power densities in association with the heat capacity of the large mass of graphite moderator result in adiabatic heat–up rates from decay heat that are only a few degrees per second.
This would delay the progress of an accident of this kind as a high temperature must be reached before graphite loses its structural support capability27.
All reactors are provided with successive barriers to prevent the release of radioactive materials, viz. the cladding of the fuel, the enclosure of the cooling circuit and the outer containment.
The postulated meltdown situation assumes that all these barriers are successfully breached — an extremely unlikely occurrence.
Even in the TMI incident, where the upper third of the core was damaged, the vast majority of the radioactive substances were retained inside the containment building.
For any thermal reactor loss of normal cooling in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident would automatically shut down the reactor and stop the chain reaction, so that the amount of heat being produced would drop very rapidly to a few per cent of the operating level. Thereafter the amount of heat being produced would decrease much more slowly and would be controlled by the decay of the radioactivity in the fuel, but additional cooling would have to be supplied to prevent the fuel from melting. To deal with this situation, water cooled reactors have what is known as the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) whose function is to provide cooling for such events. The gas–cooled reactors have ample emergency supplies of carbon dioxide to be fed into the reactor to cool the fuel.
To get even a partial meltdown in a reactor not only would the normal coolant supply have to fail, but the emergency core cooling systems would also have to fail. In all reactor systems the postulated routes to a meltdown of the core are reduced to a very low probability by a combination of diversity and redundancy.
The Ecoropa authors devote a great deal of space to the fast reactor (Q29, Q30). They question the role it can play and the timescale for its introduction, its costs and its safety. The student publication is less expansive (P7, P8) and makes similar points more succinctly.
Contrary to the Ecoropa suggestion there is no secret attempt by the Government to launch a £4 000 million (?) programme, nor has the nuclear power industry sought to mislead people on the breeding characteristics of fast reactors and the time scale for their introduction.
Indeed the student magazine makes play of the statement by the Chairman–designate of the UKAEA, Dr Walter Marshall, that fast reactors do not breed fast
.
These facts have been clearly set out in many publications28, 29, 30.
The point about fast reactors is that they can increase the energy recoverable from uranium some 60–fold and as remarked earlier this allows the 5 million tonnes of known low cost uranium resources in the world outside the centrally–planned economies (WOCA) to provide for roughly 2 500 GWe of reactors for approaching 2 000 years, in round terms. It would take 10 million million tons of coal to produce this electricity which compares with WOCA current consumption of 8 000 million tons of coal equivalent per year. This is by no means small and is independent of breeding gain. It ignores the undoubted existence of additional undiscovered low cost uranium resources and the fact that fast reactors, which only consume about 1 tonne of U–238 per GW–year, could use the lower grade higher cost uranium sources which would be too costly for thermal reactors.
The UK will have a sufficient stock of plutonium from existing thermal reactors to meet the needs for the introduction of fast reactors8. Thereafter the rate at which they can be brought into the generating system will be dependent on the breeding gains, which depends on their design, their mode of operation and the operation of their fuel cycle. Their operation will be gradual29. If the rate of growth of electricity demand exceeds the rate of expansion of indigenous plutonium stocks, then either additional thermal reactors would be needed or use might be made of plutonium from spent fuel from thermal reactors in countries without a fast reactor programme28, 30.
The capital costs and costs of electricity produced from the first fast reactors will be higher than those from thermal reactors. It is expected that both will decrease with increasing experience, with the scaling up of manufacturing capacity and with the increasing number of plants. The time at which fast reactors break even with thermal reactors will depend both on this relative capital cost and on fuel cycle costs. The fast reactor saves by avoiding enrichment costs and the need to import uranium. On the basis of present estimates the fast reactor could break even at uranium prices in the region of 75–140 $/lb U3O88, 29, a price which is significantly above present world levels ($40/lb) but not out of court for the late 1990s or the early years of the next century. This is one reason why the industry believes the option must be developed and available.
The safety of the fast reactor is ensured by designs which give several levels of protection against accidents. In normal operation the reactor is inherently stable and easily controllable and will be designed to have a wide margin of safety between operating limits and danger levels. Multiple and diverse detection and protection systems will shut the reactor down should operation deviate significantly from normal. Strong primary and secondary containment is capable of preventing the release of radioactivity even after power excursions many times larger than levels at which the safety systems would operate to limit the power.
A series of experiements have been performed in PFR which demonstrated the ability of pool–type reactors to be cooled, after shutdown, by natural circulation without power supplies of any sort. Fuller descriptions of this and other safety features have been published30, 32, 33. Any reactor, fast or thermal, will have to satisfy the NII before it can be operated commercially and the British demonstration fast reactor will itself be the subject of a wide–ranging inquiry before any decision to proceed with its construction is made.
Ecoropa question the feasibility and costs of decommissioning reactors at the end of their useful lives.
Studies have been made on the decommissioning of reactors34.
About 80 per cent of the material arising from dismantling of a power station is inactive and can be disposed of conventionally.
The decommissioning process is seen as having three stages.
First the removal of spent fuel which is a standard procedure ; second, dismantling the non–nuclear plant and instrumentation etc., and third the removal of the nuclear island to return the site to a green field
state.
Only the latter poses any unusual problems ; and feasibility studies show that it can be accomplished34. A delay is desirable between reactor shut down and stage 3 decommissioning, the length of which depends on the half–life of the induced radioactivity in the reactor structure and the value of the site. The financial allowances made for decommissioning by the CEGB are more than adequate to cover the estimated costs, bearing in mind that final decommissioning is not envisaged for many decades.
Ecoropa pose several questions about nuclear wastes and their transport (Q33–Q37), some aspects of which are echoed in the student publication (P13, P15, P17). The general contentions are that radioactive waste is dangerous, long–lived and increasing in quantity.
In general terms the three concerns as paraphrased above are correct. The matter is one of perspective and the adoption of precautions matched to the dangers. Nuclear waste is dangerous because it is radioactive and radioactivity, if not properly controlled, can harm people.
All transportation of radioactive materials has to satisfy the appropriate Government regulatory bodies as to its safety. Spent fuel, which is not properly termed waste, is transported in accordance with IAEA regulations, which allow radiation levels of 200 mrem per hour at the flask surface, or 10 mrem per hour at one metre. In fact the flasks are designed to limit the external radiaiton to well below these regulatory limits. It is typically 1 mrem per hour at one metre.
The reprocessing of spent fuel is an important and difficult task that demands that the very highest standards of plant design and operation are maintained. There have been some leaks of radiation at Windscale but no member of the public has been put at risk. Even the 1973 incident mentioned by Ecoropa led to no short term harm to workers, and the long–term risk associated with the highest level of internal contamination was estimated to be one extra chance in 100 of contracting lung cancer.
The disposal of radioactive waste is controlled by law and by international conventions. The liquid effluent from Windscale does contain more radioactivity than the discharge from Cap de la Hague, but the liquid discharged at Windscale has never exceeded the permitted levels and new plant currently under construction will further reduce levels of activity released. Monitoring is regularly carried out at Windscale and elsewhere on seawater, sediments, fish and seaweed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the results are published. They show that the levels of radioactivity in the Irish Sea remain very low.
The MV Gem sets sail once a year to dump low and intermediate level solid wastes in the Atlantic, not every month as stated by Ecoropa. More than half the activity in the waste comes from outside the nuclear industry. Deep sea disposal is conducted with international agreement and under national authorisations and the annual operation is accompanied by an escorting officer from the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD, trained in the principles of radiaiton protection and conversant with the design and construction of approved types of container. Seventy per cent of the gross weight of material dumped consists of steel and concrete packaging. The safety of sea disposal has been judged on the assumption that all the radioactivity in the waste is released immediately, although in practice the packaging will retain it for a considerable period. Any activity eventually released will be a tiny fraction of that which is present naturally in sea water. The Advisory Committee on Radioactive Waste Management which was set up following a Royal Commission recommendation has reviewed current practices in radioactive waste management and disposal and has reported that they are generally satisfactory and should not give rise to public concern. The committee approved the practice of deep sea disposal for appropriate wastes, and thought this could be somewhat increased.
The Ecoropa authors claim an absolute
link between civil nuclear power and nuclear weapons and discuss the feasibility of the home–made bomb and the possible use of nuclear blackmail by terrorists (Q38–41, P17, P18).
That fissionable materials can be used to make weapons is a fact that the abandonment of civil nuclear power could not change. Any technically competent nation with sufficient resources can make a weapon of sorts at a price. Uranium at low concentrations is widely distributed and whilst separation of U–235 is tedious and expensive it is nevertheless conceptually simple.
No country has developed nuclear weapons from a civil nuclear power programme. This would be an expensive and tedious route to nuclear weapons.
International negotiations led to the establishment of the Treaty on the Non–proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 112 nations are a party, and to the establishment of the international safeguards system under which nations open their nuclear plants to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency or Euratom. These systems act as a strong deterrent to the covert diversion of nuclear materials and ways are continually being sought to further improve them as nuclear technologies develop.
The ease of manufacture of nuclear weapons is greatly exaggerated ; nevertheless strict precautions are taken against the risk of fissile materials falling into the hands of the terrorists. There are international standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and inter–governmental co–operation in security operation.
The question of civil liberty (Q42, P23, P24) is seen by some as a major issue.
There is widespread misunderstanding about the powers of the AEA Constabulary. It is a properly constituted constabulary under the charge of a Chief Constable who reports to the Authority, whose chairman and members are appointed for fixed periods by the Secretary of State for Energy. The Secretary of State is responsible to Parliament for the policies of and actions by the Authority including its Constabulary.
An AEA constable has no more powers than any other constable authorised to act in the same area, and is likewise answerable at law for his actions.
There is clearly a need to protect nuclear materials at processing plants and research laboratories, a need which the anti–nuclear groups would not contest. The number of such sites will not increase greatly even with ambitious nuclear programmes so the non–intrusive nature of the existing security arrangements is unlikely to change noticeably. This non–intrusiveness can be verified by those who, like the present author, live in the vicinity of nuclear establishments.
If the current wave of world terrorism persists it will pose a threat to a wide range of non–nuclear plants and installations which will have to be protected. The presence or absence of a nuclear power programme will have at most a marginal effect on counter–terrorist precautions.
Far from being restricted, the staff of the AEA are encouraged to publish and to talk about their work wherever possible.
Ecoropa question the function of public inquiries, the role of nuclear power in the third world and general public acceptability (Q43–45).
It is a common human failing to criticise institutions and practices that reject our arguments.
It was not surprising that the Windscale inquiry came in for such criticism after the Inspector’s findings were published.
The fact that an Inspector, after weighing the evidence, reached a conclusion which was subsequently debated in and endorsed by Parliament scarcely supports the Ecoropa charge that democracy and nuclear power are totally incompatible
.
It is not true that world opinion has turned against nuclear power. Sweden has decided in a recent referendum to go ahead with the completion and operation of its planned nuclear programme of six reactors to add to the six already operating. In Holland, which already has one commercial reactor, the Government has proposed that three new nuclear power stations be constructed. In Maine, USA, a recent attempt to stop nuclear power generation was defeated in a referendum and several states rejected anti–nuclear motions in the recent US elections. In Britain public opinion polls in 1977 and again in 1980 have shown that a significant majority of the public are in favour of nuclear power. In Austria there are moves to reconsider the earlier narrow decision not to start up their one nuclear power station. West Germany has 14 nuclear power stations in operation, a further 11 under construction and four further plants planned. France, Japan, Spain, USA and the USSR all have larger nuclear programmes than the UK.
Nuclear power is the only proven energy source that can be expanded on the scale required as other fuels become scarce. Over the world as a whole, 234 reactors are operating in 24 countries, while 221 are under construction. When these are operating, six more countries will have nuclear power ; 133 more reactors are planned.
The role of nuclear power in the third world has yet to be established. Many third world countries see it as a desirable or even essential energy option but it is not suggested that nuclear power is suitable for all developing countries. Its use by developed countries will help to reduce demands on oil and other fossil fuels, leading more of these available for developing countries whilst helping to keep prices down at levels lower than they would otherwise have been.
The Ecoropa authors (Q46) and the student pamphlet (P28 et seq.) extol the virtues of conservation and alternative energy sources and conclude with exhortation to anti–nuclear action.
The nuclear industry is an active supporter of conservation and the development of renewable energy sources.
As was indicated earlier in this critique both are seen to be an essential part of any attempt to meet the world’s medium to long term energy needs.
Ecoropa themselves (page 65) acknoweldge that the world is threatened by … the prospect of famine and massive industrial decline
.
Their solution is to cut consumption and live within self–imposed constraints.
Such a policy of denial can only defer and not solve the world’s problems.
Neither can rejecting the one assured and proven new large–scale source of energy in the developed world help to meet the ever–growing energy needs of the third world.
Far from threatening people (P35) nuclear power opens up fresh promises.
Plentiful supplies of cheap energy are a necessary part of any society. Dung or firewood ; coal, oil or gas ; hydropower and nuclear all have a part to play. For industrial socieites large scale supplies of reliable fuels are needed and, in the era of expensive depleting oil and gas reserves, coal and nuclear power are the only serious contenders in the foreseeable future. In the long term the renewable sources and geothermal power may be able to make a significant contribution but economic and technical considerations as presently conceived suggest this can not be major until well into the next century, if then.
Nuclear power offers an economical source of energy which is environmentally preferable to the realistically available alternatives. It also makes good conservation sense. Each generation, in my view35, should seek to provide for its successors, and our generation has a responsibility to ensure that adequate energy sources are provided : not just for heat, light, and transport, but also the enable the recovery of materials from increasingly lean ores and thus expand the resource base open to mankind. Even if population levels can be stabilised during the next century, new sources of materials and energy will have to be tapped.
The social and political implications of failure to expand man’s resources to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of the developing nations and, judging by their actions, the expectation of the populace of the developed nations too, seem to me to be of far more significance than the small risks attached to the deployment of nuclear power or any other large energy source, or the marginal effect such deployment might have on nuclear weapons proliferation.
If we delay too long in substituting for oil wherever we can, we could find that energy costs do become a very real restraint. The timely expansion of nuclear generating capacity should not only help to stabilise electricity costs but should also reduce pressure on fossil sources and slow their price rises, as well as freeing coal to substitute for oil and gas in the longer term for chemical, transport fuel and appropriate heating uses. The optimistic reliance on unproven alternatives and conservation advocated by Ecoropa and the students is no recipe for a secure future.
I am indebted to my colleagues P.A.H. Saunders, A. Stone and D.M. Evans for their assistance and comments in preparing this criticism.
This volume brings together the papers and discussions from the conference under the same title which took place in London in November 1979. The conference was arranged to follow the publication of the reports of the Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Group, Energy Paper No. 35, and of its working groups. In a foreword, Dr Walter Marshall, chairman designate of the UKAEA and chairman of the CHP Group, stresses the role that district heating (DH), in association with CHP, could play in energy conservation and the need for governmental or municipal financing if suitable schemes are to go ahead in good time.
The contributors included members of the CHP Group and others who advocate that CHP/DH should be developed in the UK in accordance with the energy policy of the European Communities, which is described by M. Davis and A. Colling in Chapter 6.
There are two schools of thought on how this development might take off from its present small size, which have been likened to the ‘big bang’ and ‘continuous creation’ theories of the formation of the universe. The majority of the CHP Group, who recommended the establishment of a National Heat Board to organise the conversion of one or more large UK cities to CHP/DH as a major demonstration, represent the ‘big bang’ approach. This is described by Dr J.K. Wright of the CEGB, chaiman of the District Heating Working Party (EP 20), in Chapter 2 and by Professor J.M. Cassels, chairman of the Heat Load Density Working Party (EP 34), in Chapter 3.
The ‘big bang’ approach calls for an immediate long term commitment to the demonstration project(s) and the necessary total capital investment. Others, who subscribe to the ‘continuous creation’ school of thought, argue that a more evolutionary development could be encouraged, in which local DH schemes would eventually merge into larger systems suitable for CHP supply. In this approach, policy decisions and capital requirements would be more incremental in nature but the overall timescale might be longer. The two approaches share some common features, as the large schemes proposed by the CHP Group would develop from a number of nuclei, although these would be concentrated within a selected city instead of being more widely distributed.
A distinction may also be made between those who believe that in CHP, as in other forms of organisation, ‘big is best’ and those for whom ‘small is beautiful’. Members of the ‘big bang’ scheme favour large schemes and prime movers, while among the ‘continuous creation’ group can be found some consultants and equipment manufacturers who have been associated with existing smaller–scale schemes, which include a number of industrial CHP installations.
Institutional factors, such as the lack of close involvement of British local authorities in energy supply matters, are frequently cited in explanation of the slow progress made here by CHP/DH and Dr N.J.D. Lucas, in Chapter 4, discusses the corporate interests and pricing policies of the nationalised fuel industries vis–à–vis CHP schemes. The influence of these factors means that examples of successful systems in other countries, such as that at Odense in Denmark described in Chapter 7 by L. Larson, are not necessarily directly relevant to UK conditions. R.C. Huxford of the National Coal Board discusses socio–economic aspects of community heating systems in Chapter 5. Difficulties in the economic evaluation of, for example, health benefits, may explain why they are rarely included in assessments.
The final section of the book deals with the design and optimisation of CHP/DH systems. In Chapter 9, Dr D.J. Fisk and J.A. Macadam draw attention to the probable effects of the choice of the optimisation boundary. This problem was circumvented by the CHP Group, whose economic assessments were performed for ‘Great Britain Ltd’ but for specific projects more detailed consideration will be needed. P.J. Robinson, in Chapter 10, gives a detailed survey of heat transmission and distribution piping systems and their costs and argues strongly in favour of low system temperature (below 100°C). One difficulty is that such a low temperature may not satisfy the commercial and institutional customers whose requirements make a large contribution to the high density heat load in the central zone of cities. Lastly, in Chapter 11, A.F. Postlethwaite outlines a conceptual CHP plant installation programme for a 2 GW(th) scheme and notes some of the practical constraints in the selection of turbines and their operating parameters.
This book provides useful insights into the current status of CHP/DH in the UK and indicates some of the areas of uncertainty, which may be resolved by the jointly sponsored local studies which have now been initiated.
Here, in some 300 pages, is an authoritative and immensely readable account of the origins and development of atomic energy. Ronald Clark has much experience of his subject. He published The Birth of the Bomb in 1961, and since then his impressive list of scientific biographies has included some of the men who played great or small parts in atomic energy history — Einstein, Tizard, Appleton, Russell.
Since 1961, there has been a flood of books, papers and articles on every conceivable aspect (military and civil) of atomic energy in USA, Britain, USSR, Canada, Germany, France and Japan. There have been, in all, six volumes of official history written in Britain and USA, and innumerable other historical studies, commentaries and analyses, as well as diaries, letters, memoirs and biliographies. Important primary sources, too, have become available — especially papers opened up in our Public Record Office and in US official archives, and the US State Department documents on foreign relations. For his new book Ronald Clark as made copious use of all this material, with ample quotation, and he produces some interesting matter which does not appear to have been published before. (The account mentioned on the dust–jacket — of the coding error in a 1943 telegram from Roosevelt to Vannevar Bush — is however not new.)
The story Clark tells — while not differing in essentials from the much fuller accounts of the official historians — not only brings together a great deal of information and makes it easily accessible, but is original and fresh. It is also objective and eminently fair. Deploring chauvanism, he sees the British, American, French, Russian or German points of view impartially. He is scrupulously fair too to individuals, trying to understand their problems and motives sympathetically even when disliking or regretting their actions. Sparing with comments, his own views show more in a tone of voice than in explicit judgments.
As the subtitle — The Story of Nuclear Fission — is so wide it may be useful to indicate the scope and balance of the book. The reader will not find much technology or hardware in it, or much about organisation, or civil nuclear power, or post–1960 nuclear weapons programmes ; for these he will have to go to the official historians and other authors.
After 60 pages which recount the scientific history up to the discovery of uranium fission in December 1938, the rest of the book deals mainly with the political and military results of that discovery. 200 pages are devoted to wartime developments concluding in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the postwar period up to the US H–bomb test in 1954 ; 10 pages to fallout and the campaign against nuclear weapons in the late fifties and the early sixties ; 17 pages to radioisotopes and civil nuclear power.
In a brief epilogue, the book considers the chances that we may … fumble the last catch of all
and bring about a nuclear holocaust by accident or design.
For this is largely a book about accidents and fumbled catches
— lost opportunities of avoiding or halting the nuclear arms race.
Ronald Clark’s themes are the almost inevitable momentum of events ; failures of vision at those few points where crucial choices were possible ; the deterioration of moral perceptions ; and the lack of imaginative understanding by politicians of a new and apocalyptic power. If there is one hero in this sombre story it is the great Niels Bohr.
A few detailed criticisms.
The Smythe Report
(p226) should be the Smyth Report
.
The 1954 fallout in the Pacific (p270) did harm, and is still harming, many Marshall Islanders.
Production reactors are not fast reactors (p287) ; and highly active waste storage tanks are not sunk deep in the sea (p294).
This short monograph by Sir Martin Ryle is mainly a presentation of his views on nuclear weapons, but it includes a few short and misleading pages on the nuclear industry. It is regrettable that these should contain so many errors of fact.
The 15 GWe possible nuclear ordering programme announced by the Government in December 1979 leads to an installed nuclear capacity at the end of the century, allowing for Magnox retirements, of 22 GWe. The two figures are not, as Sir Martin suggests, incompatible.
Professor Rotblat’s Guardian article (29 May 1980) cited in the essay, which claimed that physical constraints meant that nuclear power could only meet 10 per cent of the world’s primary energy demand is incompatible with the findings of the World Energy Conference1 and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation2 and was based on an over–conservative view of the potential of fast reactors3 and world uranium resources4. Something like twice this figure could be reached by 2025, though whether it will depends on a number of factors, not least world economic growth.
Numerous articles (and whole books) have appeared on the question of comparative risks in the energy industries which serve to set the undoubted risks of uranium mining in perspective against the much larger risks of mining and using fossil fuels5, 6.
The disposal of nuclear wastes can scarcely be said not to be within sight of solution
when several routes are believed to be capable of dealing with the matter satisfactorily.
The question of fossil station closures and nuclear orders have been dealt with extensively in the literature7. Sir Martin seems unaware of the lead times involved and the fact that some 15–35 GWe of existing plant will reach the end of its useful life between now and the end of the century regardless of economic growth.
Sir Martin comments sceptically on the nuclear v. coal cost relativities. He says that the Annex to the CEGB Annual Report shows nuclear capital costs to be only 30 per cent higher than those for coal stations, which he says seems manifestly impossible. The figures in CEGB Table 4 are £88/kW p.a. for nuclear and £36 p.a. for coal (which includes a small component for the initial fuel charge and decommissioning for nuclear). [ATOM 288, October 1980, 271–272]. These figures are based on the capital cost spread over the station life and relate to the design capacity, not output. They reflect the fact that the nuclear station capital costs/kW are twice those of the coal stations, not 30 per cent higher. Sir Martin seems, mistakenly, to make some adjustment for load factors although even then his 30 per cent figure is hard to understand. Since 60 per cent of AGR costs, or rather less for PWR, are concentrated in the nuclear island8, with the remainder common to fossil and nuclear plant, it is hard to see where Sir Martin’s problem arises.
Sir Martin further alleges that nuclear programmes are planned to provide plutonium for weapons and that without attaching a credit to plutonium nuclear electricity would be uncompetitive. Again he is in error. The UK’s civil nuclear programme is necessary to meet our energy requirements and not the plutonium requirements of our weapons programme. Plutonium is not ascribed a value in calculations by the generating boards of nuclear generating costs. That there is no link between the economics of nuclear power and nuclear weapons is demonstrated by the number of countries with nuclear power programmes who have no nuclear weapons. Indeed, plutonium credits, which figured in the early days when Magnox reactors first came on the scene, disappeared as the true levels of uranium resources became clearer9 in the early 1960s.
We are all entitled to form our own views on nuclear deterrence on objective, ethical, emotional or any other grounds or on any combination of arguments. Similarly we can all have views on civil nuclear power. Professor Ryle’s attempt to link the civil power programme with the weapons programme, for whatever reason, is neither objective nor accurate and in no way helps the nuclear debate.
Petrosyants is the Chairman of the USSR State Commission for the Utilisation of Atomic Energy ; this is the fourth edition but only the second in English that the reviewer is aware of of his standard work. (The first in English appeared as ‘From scientific search to atomic industry’ in 1975, under the imprint of the American Interstate publishing company.) It deserves a wide circulation for the insight it gives into the Russian civil nuclear programme ; it is especially interesting to see his treatment of radioactive waste disposal :
“The problems of radioactive waste disposal, treatment and burial disturb many people, especially those not very well acquainted with the whole complex of technological processes of this type of production … A great deal of work has been undertaken in the Soviet Union and in other countries to investigate methods of burial, including deep underground burial of medium– and low–active wastes, and quite a number of reliable, safe and economic methods of burying low and medium radioactive wastes have been found.”
However,
“…it is not so easy to find regions which meet all the requirements for the reliable burial of highly–active wastes.”
The Soviet Union is planning a considerable expansion of nuclear electricity generation, including the use of fast reactors.
Here, although Petrosyants assures the reader that the USSR and its allies are in no way dependent on the West for uranium, the problem of the rational utilisation of uranium is becoming very important, and the future development of nuclear power generation is changing into the very big problem of providing nuclear fuel for the nuclear power stations under construction.
At some stage in the development of nuclear power generation, fast neutron reactors in proportion to the assimilation and accumulation in sufficient quantity of plutonium will replace thermal neutron reactors.
Petrosyants adds that higher breeding ratios than those achieved in the West will be required.
Without the accelerated development and assimilation of fast neutron reactors the intensive development of nuclear power generation will be impossible to achieve.
All in all, this book is essential reading for all those interested in what is happening on the other side of the fence.
Previous editions of this work by Samuel Glasstone, now in its third incarnation (with Alexander Sesonke), have searved as an invaluable ready reference for almost literally generations of students, as well as hard–pressed engineers.
His Sourcebook on Atomic Energy, first published in 1950, was a pioneering venture ; Dr Glasstone was awarded the Worcester Reed Warner medal of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1959 for his outstanding contribution to permanent engineering literature in … writings on atomic energy
.
Glasstone
is still a standard.
In this edition, the scope is widened beyond the familiar treatment of reactor theory to include discussion of reactor safety, and of the environmental effects of nuclear power.
Regrettably, the emphasis throughout remains on light–water reactors, but given the imminence of the public inquiry into the CEGB’s proposed PWR at Sizewell this may be no bad thing.
The fourth edition of this practical text contains all a radioisotope worker needs to know about the design of experiments, safe handling, preparation for counting and measurement of radioisotopes, and current safety legislation
, according to the blurb.
The book is indeed a straightforward guide to modern radioisotope laboratory techniques, in four main sections : the basic physics of radioactivity ; health physics, safety and legislation ; the measurement of radioisotopes ; and laboratory and industrial applications.
The authors — retired leader of the Isotope Group at AERE Harwell, and senior lecturer in radiochemistry at the University of Salford, respectively — have an impeccable pedigree.
It is generally reckoned that the world was alerted to the implications of finite energy supplies in 1973, when OPEC increased oil prices abruptly. With half of the world’s fuels being derived from oil, the need to reduce dependence on a fuel that was expected to become increasingly scarce was recognised. Yet this is not an altogether unprecedented situation, for there has never been a time of limitless fuel supply. Seen in the longer–term perspective of centuries, economies have successively depended predominantly on a particular fuel that was destined to be replaced : animal and human labour by wood and water–power, wood by coal, coal by oil — and oil by what?
This perspective is set out clearly in a recently published report of a major study by a large international team of scientists who collaborated at IIASA from 1973 (just before the OPEC price rise) over a period of seven years on a study of global energy futures. It addresses the question of whether sufficient energy supplies can be made available to fuel the world’s economies over the next 50 years. The long term view was taken because IIASA’s initial goal was to find a transition from an energy system based on depletable resources to one based on renewable resources and, since the lifetime of large energy installations is of the order of 25 years, a 50–year span is not unreasonable. Also, a global approach was considered necessary to deal with the international dependence on, and trade in, energy supplies.
It is a detailed report (two volumes totalling about 1 000 pages) and justice cannot be done in a short review to the wealth of material it containes. The individual primary energy sources and their interactions are discussed, and there are sections on market penetration, risks, climatic effects and so on. The focus of this review is on the team’s general findings, their method, and two topical issues : the position of the third world and the role of nuclear power.
The team found that the transition to virtually renewable energy sources such as nuclear and solar power was elusive and judged that what could be done in 50 years is a lesser and preliminary transition from current dependence on clean conventional
fossil fuels to dirty unconventional
fossil fuels such as heavy crudes, tar sands and oil shales.
These would be augmented by increasing and substantial contributions from nuclear power (23 per cent of primary energy supplies in the year 2030) and energy conservation (30–40 per cent in 2030) and a lesser contribution from other renewables (8–10 per cent of primary supplies in 2030).
The potential for increasing energy conservation, which broadly means the more efficient use of energy to provide a given economic output, was considered to be much greater in the developed industrialised regions than in developing regions.
Dependence on oil remains high throughout the projected period owing to its advantages in storage and transport, and a considerable and increasing contribution is required in the next century from the liquefaction of coal.
In total, the physical resources are found to be vast : the difficulty lies in producing energy from them cheaply and quickly enough.
The necessary capital investment is estimated as a proportion of total production and is found to rise from a current 2 per cent to a maximum 4 per cent for developed regions and 7 per cent for developing regions.
The resource which is found to be critically scarce is time!
Even these findings, less welcome though they may be than achievement of the original goal, are possibly still somewhat optimistic. In dealing with so complex a problem, it is clearly necessary to set limits on the scope of a study, even one as comprehensive and detailed as this one. Thus, the IIASA findings are based upon what is technically and economically possible in a surprise–free world and rely on an optimistic, but feasible, degree of international co–operation. The retarding effects of social and political constraints are not considered, even though vigorous energy conservation programmes and aggressive exploration for additional resources are relied upon.
The IIASA method is to set the 50–year projection into the temporal perspective of, roughly, the past and future 100 years. This is excellent for a longer–term projection since it helps to dispel any overly pessimistic colouration of current short–term, local viewpoints arising from the present economic recession. The quantified history of fuel consumption is set out, showing the substitution patterns mentioned above, and the future potentials of the various primary energy options are explored. A global approach is achieved by dividing the world into seven regions each composed of countries having generally similar energy and economic characteristics. Future energy demands are then analysed in detail and a self–consistent set of supply and demand patterns are expressed in the form of two scenarios. These are not predictions, but are intended to illustrate the middle ground of possibilities within the stated assumptions. The starting–points for the demand projections are : (a) the regional population growth rates, those of the next 50 years being described as the highest mankind has ever known, with 90 per cent of the population expansion occurring in the developing regions ; and (b) two sets of regional economic growth rates (one high and one low) differentiating the two scenarios, both of which are described as moderate.
In fact, the economic growth rates decline with time in all regions, but are generally set higher in the developing regions, where economic expansion is more urgently needed but where the high rate of population growth largely offsets the higher economic growth. Even through the share of the four developing regions in total primary energy increases from about 15 per cent in 1975 to about 40 per cent in 2030, only two regions increase their income per caput levels in the high scenario sufficiently to exceed the current levels of Western Europe, and these are the resource–rich regions of the Middle East/North Africa and Latin America, which together represent only 14 per cent of the projected world population. The other two developing regions (the rest of Africa together with South–East Asia, and China plus the centrally planned economies of Asia), together representing 66 per cent of the projected world population, achieve only one quarter of the current European level. This rate of closure of the developing/developed economy gap appears to be about one half that of the UN New Economic Order quoted by IIASA. If the latter should materialise, then one might expect a considerable impact on IIASA’s energy consumption projections.
On nuclear energy the report points out that uranium resources represent a foreseeably limited energy source in the long–term global view if used only in thermal fission reactors without recycling, but states that the practical way of extending them substantially is to introduce breeder reactors which would then increase the energy resource ot a hundred times that of the total of conventional and unconventional fossil fuels.
It is judged that this establishes nuclear energy as a virtually renewable energy source, since the supply would be independent of resource constraints.
Further, the report states, since fast reactors have not been installed sufficiently quickly to date it is now necessary to enhance the overall uranium–efficiency of the reactor programme by using thorium, which can be converted to fissile uranium–233.
Nuclear fusion potential is enormous, but IIASA judge that global commercial application will take more than 50 years.
Thus, the report calls for the timely investment of a substantial part of our high–quality natural uranium resources in fast reactors.
Installed nuclear capacity projections expand in the IIASA scenarios to around 3–5 000 GWe by 2030.
This level is considerably below what IIASA estimate might have been, because there is just not enough time to build up the nuclear industry
to a higher level.
IIASA investigate variations on the two main scenarios using three supplementary cases, including one that imposes a nuclear moratorium. It is found that primary energy needs could still be met in the lower of the two main scenarios, but only at still higher cost and with unnecessary envrionmental and social burdens.
IIASA have succeeded in providing a valuable, quantified, long–term framework of global energy futures with considerable detail and adherence to self–consistency, pointing to an undeniable interdependence of the regions of the world. There is obviously much uncertainty attaching to such projections and plenty of scope for alternative scenarios, but as Roger Levien, Director of IIASA, states in the foreword to the report, those who disagree with some of the assumptions, methods, or conclusions are challenged to trace the consequences of alternative views with similar degrees of quantification and coherence. The message of the IIASA work is that energy supplies can be made available for world development, but if they are to materialise we must work for the co–operative world that IIASA assumes as a background to their projections, and use available time wisely to develop the necessary energy technologies adequately.
This is a very good book. It is also unfashionably objective, and cheap. It deserves, and should get, a wide readership even if there are those who are disappointed that it knocks down some of their favourite canards.
Sir Alan set out to write a simple guide to nuclear safety ; he says almost nothing about the costs of nuclear power, the availability of uranium supplies, the general energy problem or the need for electricity, though he does deal with security, proliferation, the so–called plutonium economy
and nuclear wastes.
His opening words set the scene :
“A situation so full of fear and confusion that responsible members of the general public feel compelled to write of the ‘malignant growth of nuclear power stations’ is quite intolerable. The general public is entitled to something better than this.”
Civil nuclear power, he says, has become one of the most controversial political issues in western democracies. It might be supposed that there have been some terrible disasters caused by nuclear power plants, with great damage and loss of life. But nothing could be further from the truth. The safety record of the nuclear industry has been almost immaculate ; there has been only one serious accident to any civil nuclear reactor, that at Three Mile Island in 1979, and no member of the general public was injured physically by this. Why then all the worry?
“It is not about any actual harm but an apprehension about future possibilities. The public fears are imaginary in the sense that they are based, not on anything that has really happened, but what people have been led to believe might happen.”
Those who have expert knowledge and real understanding of the technical and other issues, he says, surely have a responsibility to present the facts and to explain their significance in as simple, straightforward, complete and balanced a manner as possible.
Sir Alan pulls no punches.
The general public has been let down by practically everyone concerned, in his view.
When the experts are at sixes and sevens, how can the general public be other than extremely uneasy about the whole subject and inclined to view every professional statement with suspicion?
The proper way is to put the whole issue, warts and all, fairly before the general public in an understandable form and to refute decisively, in public, all nonsense dressed up as ‘science’ by the sensation mongers.
Sir Alan judges others by stern criteria ; for himself, I can simply try to steer what I hope is a fair course.
He declares his position : I am in principle in favour of nuclear energy because I do not think that the coming multitudes can survive the bitter winds and sunless winters of the next century without it ; and secondly because it is my view … that nuclear energy can be made a sufficiently safe form of energy, certainly safer than any realistic large–scale alternative.
[His emphasis.]
The presentation is orderly, moving from the elements of nuclear physics and the basics of nuclear power generation, through a discussion of radiation effects and the bases of radiological protection. The treatment of these topics is masterly.
We then come to what many will see as the nub of the matter, though it takes up only a few pages in a book of more than 120, especially in the run–up to the promised inquiry into the pressurised water reactor in Britain.
While Sir Alan hopes to steer a straight course he does nevertheless concentrate on the demerits of the PWR.
All reactor systems have both merits and demerits (including CANDU, incidentally), and if he wanted to paint the picture warts and all
it would have been a more balanced composition if he had paid more attention to the demerits, as well as the merits, of other reactor systems.
Be that as it may. Some years ago there was a widely–reported exchange of views between Sir Alan and Dr Walter Marshall, chaiman of the UKAEA and of a study group set up to examine the integrity of PWR pressure vessels. In this book Sir Alan considers the different types of reactor and means of assuring emergency core cooling in the event of either coolant circuit breaks, or pressure vessel ruptures. In the particular case of PWR pressure vessels, he concludes that the very best manufacturing practices must be applied, and that these must be supplemented by an inspection procedure sufficiently stringent to ensure that no cracks of dangerous size are left in the thick metal sections or develop during service. Methods for repairing cracks which develop in service should also be developed. This topic is very obviously a live issue ; it is worth repeating from the reviewer’s chair that there have been repeated assurances from all concerned that no PWR would be licensed for operation in Britain unless adequate assurance of its safety in service had been obtained.
Sir Alan moves on to consider ways of obtaining defence in depth
against reactor accidents : the prevention and containment of meltdowns, isolation and so on ; and ways of calculating margins of safety — the principles of fault–tree analysis.
In the concluding chapters he looks at what some have called human engineering
— the publems which may be created by operator error, and ways of guarding against them ; security (as opposed to safety) questions ; and the proliferation issue.
What can we conclude?
Broadly, that civil nuclear power can in principle be safe.
The question of the extent to which it will be safe in practice depends on … the choices of particular types of plant and processes, and on the formulation of and insistence upon rigorous standards.
Accidents will of course always happen.
But it is entirely within reach of present capabilities to ensure that bad accidents, which produce public casualties, will occur much more rarely than equally bad accidents in other walks of life that are already publicly tolerated as bearable in relation to the benefits provided.
[His emphasis.]
All in all, this is a book which badly needed to be written.
An eyeblink of geological time is all that stands between us and the end of the world as we know it.
It is a breathing space — a breathing space in the sense that the fuels which powered the growth of the industrialised world are still available and will, subject to political rather than technological considerations, be available for long enough to allow the world to develop alternatives which will not run out.
At times of crisis and transition, miracles are sought, forecasts are demanded, and wild figures are thrown around which make wise decisions difficult and irresponsible actions most likely.
The first quotation is from Don Hedley’s book ; the second from Dan Ion’s. The contrast in style and approach exemplifies the difference between the two books. Hedley’s is a journalist’s book ; the author works in the public affairs department of a major oil company. Ion grew up in the oil industry ; he ranks as an elder statesman. The authors share the conclusion that for some time to come it will be the fuels of today — oil, coal, gas and nuclear power — which must provide the bulk of the power of tomorrow ; but that the way in which these are used must and will change.
Ion’s book, of which this is the second edition, is a tour de force.
He sets out to assist the understanding of the numbers, concepts and factors on which judgment of energy resources problems must be based, whether by an individual, group or government.
His principal conclusion is that there are large energy resources of many kinds in many parts of the world ; but that the measure of these resources is inaccurate and lacks sufficiently widespread knowledge to reconcile the different concepts and technologies to gain a comparability warranted by the growing interdependence of energy resource utilisation.
His presentation is splendidly lucid.
The ‘renewables’ — valuable as they may be in the future energy equation — receive scant attention.
Ion writes in his first chapter :
…the solar base is very large, it has little practical value, and there are differences between the facts and measurement points in the various modes of expression.
The effect of tides, currents and winds, a combined lunar and solar effect, on waves to create the transfer of energy across a line as wave power can be calculated and is said to indicate ‘prodigious amounts of power’. Again, until a technology is developed to utilise that power, and work is being done in this field, the total immensity, the resource base, is only of academic interest.
The total amount [of geothermal energy] is of far less significance than the specific amount at any point and this is true even when the normal, rather than abnormal, heat flow and temperature differences are used in the heat pump…
and so on. Ion is of course concerned mostly with what we’ve got, rather than what we might have one day : vide his comment on nuclear fuels :
“The resource base of nuclear energy is immense because of the widespread dissemination of radioactive material … [With respect to fuels for fusion reactors of the future, the] figures indicate a resource base which is virtually infinite and, so noting, warrants no further discussion.”
A splendid book.
Don Hedley set himself the near–impossible task of discussing first what fuels are being used now, by whom and at what rate ; supply prospects ; global economic trends ; and arriving at a best estimate
of world suppliable energy demand to the year 2000.
And all of this in only 189 pages of text, to which are appended no fewer than 154 tables.
Apart from coal, in Hedley’s view, the only ‘fuel’ likely to increase its share of world energy consumption between now and the end of the century will be nuclear power, with a six–fold increase.
Placed against many of the predictions made in previous years, this is a modest increase
, he says ; but nuclear power is second only to oil in its responsiveness to atmospheres and has not yet recovered from the public relations disaster of Three Mile Island.
This is, as I said, a journalist’s book — by which I mean that it has been written by a journalist, and it may be none the worse for that.
To my eye, however, it is a snapshot in which the foreground is cluttered and the middle distance fogged.
On the horizon, Hedley sees a bright future for the renewables, which must eventually dominate world energy supply
; but I was left wondering just how we were going to get there from here.
The catchy title of this book was chosen to drive home Grenon’s lesson that apples and oranges can’t be balanced against each other as in a mathematical equation, but that they can both form part of a balanced diet.
Grenon hails from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Vienna–based think tank
whose massive report on ‘Energy in a Finite World’ is reviewed elsewhere.
Although he bgan his professional life as a nuclear engineer he has, on the evidence of this book, come to look at nuclear energy with a jaundiced eye ; and he sets out to look at the alternatives.
He starts with the proposition that when one has said that one does not understand a great deal about future energy demands and that one does not know much more about the resources called upon to satisfy them, one has said almost everything
; but he concludes that resources to support the present energy economy are big enough to allow time for reflection.
The growth of world energy demand has had its wings clipped.
It is coming to reason after an exceptional bout of fever lasting nearly a quarter of a century.
This pause, before the flight into the unknown, is salutary.
This is a worthy book (and the quality of the translation from the original French is excellent), but one could wish that Grenon had paid more attention to constraints in the use of the renewables.
This directory appeared first in 1961 ; the fifth edition was published as the Nuclear Research Index in 1976. This new edition carries information on 2 500 organisations in more than 90 countries which conduct, promote or encourage research in the nuclear field — liberally defined to cover everything from nuclear and high energy physics, through reactor technology and instrumentation, materials and manufacturing in the nuclear industry to law and insurance and economics and forecasting and a multitude of other topics beside. The presentation is alphabetically by country, indexed by title, keyword and subject. Valuable on the library shelf : but what a pity the cost is so high, especially as some of the entries (e.g., that for the UKAEA) have been out–dated during production.
Indispensible for anyone who wishes to know that a fast breeder reactor is a Schnellbrüter in Germany, a reactor reproductor rápido in Spain, a réacteur surrégénerateur rapide in France, a reattore veloce autofissilizzante in Italy and a reactor reproductor rapido in Portugal — or needs translation of the 1 599 other terms to or from the six languages used. Potentially I would have thought of greatest use to the energy specialist reading outside his own field.
This is a useful introduction, based on a one–year course given to final year students of mechanical engineering at the University of Strathclyde, to the principles of electricity generation from nuclear fission. The discussion is lucid, though it assumes a good working knowledge of mathematics — understandably, given the intended audience.
Judd’s stated purpose is to introduce the newcomer to the study of fast reactors, either as a student or at a later stage of his career. The book will be most useful to someone who already has some knowledge of reactors. Judd acknowledges in the preface that it is not comprehensive ; but there is an extensive list of references. As is implied by the title, the treatment throughout is solidly grounded in practical considerations of real reactor engineering requirements.