This is not so much a review ;
it is more a cry of pain.
The nuclear debate in Britain has become characterised by the proliferation of books and pamphlets —
emanating from both sides —
for the better education of the public in the opposing points of view.
Most, whether one agrees with them or not, can be seen to have some point.
The Nuclear Disaster can not, though there are undoubtedly some who will draw aid and comfort from it.
It is always nice to have one’s prejudices confirmed by something in writing, especially when that something
purports, as does this report, to have been prepared by a collective of journalists who publish information not covered or collated by the established media.
It is their aim to investigate the major social and economic institutions that govern our daily lives in order that the basic assumptions behind them be as widely known as possible
.
Ah hah, the reader might think :
here we have a report which tells us what is really going on behind the smokescreen put out by the nuclear industry.
If The Nuclear Disaster fulfilled its promise it would, indeed, be a document useful to both sides in the debate
, pro and anti.
The pity of it is that it does not ;
and what is more, very often it misses its apparent target completely.
Facts are one thing ;
opinions about facts are another ;
from the very existence of the nuclear debate one can infer that opinions about the nuclear industry and its role can and do differ.
And so they should :
the industry should be asked to explain what it is up to and carry as many as possible of the public along with it.
At present the industry is under attack from a hefty and vociferous minority, whose right to argue their case as often and as loudly as they like is not in question.
For its part, the industry does attempt to make the facts about what it is doing as widely known as possible, so that both sides may talk about the same things.
The Atomic Energy Authority when it was formed in 1954 was given statutory authority to distribute information relating to, and educate and train persons in matters connected with, atomic energy...
and it has been working to do just those things ever since :
1979 is our Silver Jubilee Year, and the Information Services Branch and public information offices at our establishments are working harder than ever.
So, it hurts to be told by CIS that for the last 30 years the industry has been wrapped in official secrecy.
No attempt has been made to justify this secretiveness.
Behind the official smokescreens there has developed an unwieldy but powerful nuclear establishment with a ponderous momentum of its own.
It will brook no arguments...
If that were true, would I be here?
Very well, CIS are entitled to their opinions.
Should the anti–nuclear brigade ever form a majority in this country, the workings of our democracy would no doubt see to it that the nuclear industry was wound up as CIS demand.
But their grasp of facts is tenuous, to say the least.
Thus, they make a number of silly errors on matters of easily–checkable fact —
something no journalist or collective of journalists should do.
Lord Hill
is presumably Sir John Hill, chairman of the Authority ;
Until recently, Sir Walter Marshall, ex–head of the AEA...
I take to be a reference to Dr Walter Marshall, the present deputy chairman of the AEA (and never its head, though he is an ex–head of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell).NOTE
The list of UKAEA establishments given at the back includes Aldermaston (since 1973 with the Ministry of Defence), Amersham (site of the headquarters of The Radiochemical Centre Ltd, hived off from the AEA in 1971), Blacknest and Bracknell (gone to the Ministry of Defence)... and so on.
For the record, the UKAEA has establishments at Winfrith, Harwell, Culham, Risley, Springfields, Windscale and Dounreay —
some on sites shared with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, which was hived off similarly in 1971.
If CIS had asked for this information we would have told them ;
but they didn’t have to.
It is published in our annual reports, which they had.
There are more substantial howlers than these.
More and more of the work of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, CIS say, involves mopping up the effects of past decisions ;
e.g. disposing of 20 000 tonnes of depleted uranium accumulated from the weapons programme of the 1960s
.
This stock of depleted uranium —
which results both from the enrichment of uranium, and recovery from spent fuel —
is being held against the day when it might be used in fast reactors.
Used in that way, it might have an energy content equivalent to some 40 000 million tonnes of coal ;
disposing
of it is just what BNFL is not doing.
Then again, fast breeder reactors... do not normally use a moderator.
Breeder reactors produce more fissile atoms than they burn :
supposedly they will, when working, produce fuel as well as electricity.
That is the general idea, yes.
But by definition fast reactors do not use a moderator, the function of which is to slow fast neutrons emitted in fission to enable a chain reaction to proceed in reactors burning natural or only slightly enriched uranium.
Mention of enriched uranium reminds me that CIS seem to believe that the German undertaking Uranit is somehow in competition with Urenco, whereas it is the German shareholder.
(This point was raised at the press conference CIS gave to launch their report.
On being told of Uranit’s connection with Urenco, one of the CIS collective answered :
Yes, well, I can only take your word for that.
)
CIS make great play of their understanding of the economics of nuclear power, pointing to the large investments which have been made in nuclear technology in Britain for the sake of only (!) some 13 per cent of total electricity generation so far.NOTE A detailed discussion of the economics of nuclear power appeared in the December 1978 issue of ATOM, and I shall not repeat it here. Perhaps it is worth drawing attention, however, to one more simple misunderstanding. CIS put the cost of one of the AGRs at Hunterston being out of action for a year at £40 million. But this is largely the cost to the South of Scotland Electricity Board of making up electricity production using their more expensive fossil–fuelled plant. Although the direct costs of repairs to the reactor have risen considerably since they were first made, they still do not exceed £10 million.
I cannot recommend ATOM readers to buy The Nuclear Disaster. But borrow it if you can. It is instructive of an apparent trend to unreason in the nuclear debate which I, for one, find worrying.